

Simple Priced Timed Games Are Not That Simple*

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Abstract

Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important subclass of theirs (the so-called *simple* priced timed games), one can compute, in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock).

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
1 Introduction

The importance of models inspired from the field of game theory is nowadays well-established in theoretical computer science. They allow to describe and analyse the possible interactions of antagonistic agents (or players) as in the *controller synthesis* problem, for instance. This problem asks, given a model of the environment of a system, and of the possible actions of a controller, to compute a controller that constraints the environment to respect a given specification. Clearly, one can not, in general, assume that the two players (the environment and the controller) will collaborate, hence the need to find a *controller strategy* that enforces the specification *whatever the environment does*. This question thus reduces to computing a so-called winning strategy for the corresponding player in the game model.

In order to describe precisely the features of complex computer systems, several game models have been considered in the literature. In this work, we focus on the model of Priced Timed Games [16] (PTGs for short), which can be regarded as an extension (in several directions) of classical finite automata [2], PTGs have *clocks*, which are real-valued variables whose values evolve with time elapsing, and which can be tested and reset along the transitions. Second, the locations are associated with price-rates

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■ **Figure 1** A simple priced timed game (left) and the lower value function of location ℓ_1 (right).

and transitions are labeled by discrete prices, as in priced timed automata [4, 3, 6]. These prices allow one to associate a *cost* with all runs (or plays), which depends on the sequence of transitions traversed by the run, and on the time spent in each visited location. Finally, a PTG is played by two players, called **Min** and **Max**, and each location of the game is owned by either of them (we consider a turn-based version of the game). The player who controls the current location decides how long to wait, and which transition to take.

In this setting, the goal of **Min** is to reach a given set of target locations, following a play whose cost is as small as possible. Player **Max** has an antagonistic objective: he tries to avoid the target locations, and, if not possible, to maximise the accumulated cost up to the first visit of a target location. To reflect these objectives, we define the upper value $\overline{\text{Val}}$ of the game as a mapping of the configurations of the PTG to the least cost that **Min** can guarantee while reaching the target, whatever the choices of **Max**. Similarly, the lower value $\underline{\text{Val}}$ returns the greatest cost that **Max** can ensure (letting the cost being $+\infty$ in case the target locations are not reached).

An example of PTG is given in Figure 1, where the locations of **Min** (respectively, **Max**) are represented by circles (respectively, rectangles), and the integers next to the locations are their price-rates, i.e., the cost of spending one time unit in the location. Moreover, there is only one clock x in the game, which is never reset and all guards on transitions are $x \in [0, 1]$ (hence this guard is not displayed and transitions are only labeled by their respective discrete cost): this is an example of *simple priced timed game*, as we will define them properly later. It is easy to check that **Min** can force reaching the target location ℓ_f from all configurations (ℓ, ν) of the game, where ℓ is a location and ν is a real valuation of the clock in $[0, 1]$. Let us comment on the optimal strategies for both players. From a configuration (ℓ_4, ν) , with $\nu \in [0, 1]$, **Max** better waits until the clock takes value 1, before taking the transition to ℓ_f (he is forced to move, by the rule of the game). Hence, **Max**'s optimal value is $3(1 - \nu) - 7 = -3\nu - 4$ from all configurations (ℓ_4, ν) . Symmetrically, it is easy to check that **Min** better waits as long as possible in ℓ_7 , hence his optimal value is $-16(1 - \nu)$ from all configurations (ℓ_7, ν) . However, optimal value functions are not always *that simple*, see for instance the lower value function of ℓ_1 on the right of Figure 1, which is a piecewise affine function. To understand why value functions can be piecewise affine, consider the sub-game enclosed in the dotted rectangle in Figure 1, and consider the value that **Min** can guarantee from a configuration of the form (ℓ_3, ν) in this sub-game. Clearly, **Min** must decide how long he will spend in ℓ_3 and whether he will go to ℓ_4 or ℓ_7 . His optimal value from all (ℓ_3, ν) is thus $\inf_{0 \leq t \leq 1-\nu} \min(4t + (-3(\nu+t) - 4), 4t + 6 - 16(1 - (\nu+t))) = \min(-3\nu - 4, 16\nu - 10)$. Since $16\nu - 10 \geq -3\nu - 4$ if and only if $\nu \leq 6/19$, the best choice of **Min** is to move instantaneously to ℓ_7 if $\nu \in [0, 6/19]$ and to move instantaneously to ℓ_4 if $\nu \in (6/19, 1]$, hence the value function of ℓ_3 (in the subgame) is a piecewise affine function with two pieces.

Related work. PTGs were independently investigated in [8] and [1]. For (non-necessarily turn-based) PTGs with *non-negative* prices, semi-algorithms are given to decide the *value problem* that is to say, whether the lower value of a location (the best cost that Min can guarantee in valuation 0), is below a given threshold. They also showed that, under the *strongly non-Zeno assumption* on prices (asking the existence of $\kappa > 0$ such that every cycle in the underlying region graph has a cost at least κ), the proposed semi-algorithms always terminate. This assumption was justified in [11, 7] by showing that, in the absence of non-Zeno assumption, the *existence problem*, that is to decide whether Min has a strategy guaranteeing to reach a target location with a cost below a given threshold, is indeed undecidable for PTGs with non-negative prices and three or more clocks. This result was recently extended in [9] to show that the *value problem* is also undecidable for PTGs with non-negative prices and four or more clocks. In [5], the undecidability of the existence problem has also been shown for PTGs with arbitrary price-rates (without prices on transitions), and two or more clocks. On a positive side, the value problem was shown decidable by [10] for PTGs with one clock when the prices are non-negative: a 3-exponential time algorithm was first proposed, further refined in [17, 15] into an exponential time algorithm. The key point of those algorithms is to reduce the problem to the computation of optimal values in a restricted family of PTGs called *Simple Priced Timed Games* (SPTGs for short), where the underlying automata contain no guard, no reset, and the play is forced to stop after one time unit. More precisely, the PTG is decomposed into a sequence of SPTGs whose value functions are computed and re-assembled to yield the value function of the original PTG. Alternatively, and with radically different techniques, a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to solve one-clock PTGs with arbitrary prices on transitions, and price-rates restricted to two values amongst $\{-d, 0, +d\}$ (with $d \in \mathbb{N}$) was given in [13].

Contributions. Following the decidability results sketched above, we consider PTGs with one clock. We extend those results by considering arbitrary (positive and negative) prices. Indeed, all previous works on PTGs with only one clock (except [13]) have considered non-negative weights only, and the status of the more general case with arbitrary weights has so far remained elusive. Yet, arbitrary weights are an important modeling feature. Consider, for instance, a system which can consume but also produce energy at different rates. In this case, energy consumption could be modeled as a positive price-rate, and production by a negative price-rate. We propose an *exponential time algorithm to compute the value of one-clock SPTGs with arbitrary weights*. While this result might sound limited due to the restricted class of simple PTGs we can handle, we recall that the previous works mentioned above [10, 17, 15] have demonstrated that solving SPTGs is a key result towards solving more general PTGs. Moreover, this algorithm is, as far as we know, the first to handle the full class of SPTGs with arbitrary weights, and we note that the solutions (either the algorithms or the proofs) known so far do not generalise to this case. Finally, as a side result, this algorithm allows us to solve the more general class of *reset-acyclic* one-clock PTGs that we introduce. Thus, although we can not (yet) solve the whole class of PTGs with arbitrary weights, our result may be seen as a potentially important milestone towards this goal.

Some proofs and technical details are in the Appendix.

2 Priced timed games: syntax, semantics, and preliminary results

Notations and definitions. Let x denote a positive real-valued variable called *clock*. A *guard* (or *clock constraint*) is an interval with endpoints in $\mathbb{N} \cup \{+\infty\}$. We often abbreviate

guards, for instance $x \leq 5$ instead of $[0, 5]$. Let $S \subseteq \text{Guard}(x)$ be a finite set of guards. We let $\llbracket S \rrbracket = \bigcup_{I \in S} I$. Assuming $M_0 = 0 < M_1 < \dots < M_k$ are all the endpoints of the intervals in S (to which we add 0), we let $\text{Reg}_S = \{(M_i, M_{i+1}) \mid 0 \leq i \leq k-1\} \cup \{\{M_i\} \mid 0 \leq i \leq k\}$ be the set of *regions* of S . Observe that Reg_S is also a set of guards.

We rely on the notion of *cost function* to formalise the notion of optimal value function sketched in the introduction. Formally, for a set of guards $S \subseteq \text{Guard}(x)$, a *cost function* over S is a function $f: \llbracket \text{Reg}_S \rrbracket \rightarrow \bar{\mathbf{R}} = \mathbf{R} \cup \{+\infty, -\infty\}$ such that over all regions $r \in \text{Reg}_S$, f is either infinite or a continuous piecewise affine function, with a finite set of cutpoints (points where the first derivative is not defined) $\{\kappa_1, \dots, \kappa_p\} \subseteq \mathbf{Q}$, and with $f(\kappa_i) \in \mathbf{Q}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq p$. In particular, if $f(r) = \{f(\nu) \mid \nu \in r\}$ contains $+\infty$ (respectively, $-\infty$) for some region r , then $f(r) = \{+\infty\}$ ($f(r) = \{-\infty\}$). We denote by CF_S the set of all cost functions over S . In our algorithm to solve SPTGs, we will need to combine cost functions thanks to the \triangleright operator. Let $f \in \text{CF}_S$ and $f' \in \text{CF}_{S'}$ be two costs functions on set of guards $S, S' \subseteq \text{Guard}(x)$, such that $\llbracket S \rrbracket \cap \llbracket S' \rrbracket$ is a singleton. We let $f \triangleright f'$ be the cost function in $\text{CF}_{S \cup S'}$ such that $(f \triangleright f')(\nu) = f(\nu)$ for all $\nu \in \llbracket \text{Reg}_S \rrbracket$, and $(f \triangleright f')(\nu) = f'(\nu)$ for all $\nu \in \llbracket \text{Reg}_{S'} \rrbracket \setminus \llbracket \text{Reg}_S \rrbracket$.

We consider an extended notion of one-clock priced timed games (PTGs for short) allowing for the use of *urgent locations*, where only a zero delay can be spent, and *final cost functions* which are associated with each final location and incur an extra cost to be paid when ending the game in this location. Formally, a PTG \mathcal{G} is a tuple $(L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$ where L_{Min} (respectively, L_{Max}) is a finite set of *locations* for player Min (respectively, Max), with $L_{\text{Min}} \cap L_{\text{Max}} = \emptyset$; L_f is a finite set of *final* locations, and we let $L = L_{\text{Min}} \cup L_{\text{Max}} \cup L_f$ be the whole location space; $L_u \subseteq L \setminus L_f$ indicates *urgent* locations¹; $\Delta \subseteq (L \setminus L_f) \times \text{Guard}(x) \times \{\top, \perp\} \times L$ is a finite set of *transitions*; $\varphi = (\varphi_\ell)_{\ell \in L_f}$ associates to each $\ell \in L_f$ its *final cost function*, that is an affine² cost function φ_ℓ over $S_\mathcal{G} = \{I \mid \exists \ell, R, \ell' : (\ell, I, R, \ell') \in \Delta\}$; $\pi: L \cup \Delta \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}$ mapping an integer *price* to each location—its *price-rate*—and transition.

Intuitively, a transition (ℓ, I, R, ℓ') changes the current location from ℓ to ℓ' if the clock has value in I and the clock is reset according to the Boolean R . We assume that, in all PTGs, the clock x is *bounded*, i.e., there is $M \in \mathbf{N}$ such that for all guards $I \in S_\mathcal{G}$, $I \subseteq [0, M]$.³ We denote by $\text{Reg}_\mathcal{G}$ the set $\text{Reg}_{S_\mathcal{G}}$ of *regions* of \mathcal{G} . We further denote⁴ by $\Pi_\mathcal{G}^{\text{tr}}$, $\Pi_\mathcal{G}^{\text{loc}}$ and $\Pi_\mathcal{G}^{\text{fn}}$ respectively the values $\max_{\delta \in \Delta} |\pi(\delta)|$, $\max_{\ell \in L} |\pi(\ell)|$ and $\sup_{\nu \in [0, M]} \max_{\ell \in L} |\varphi_\ell(\nu)| = \max_{\ell \in L} \max(|\varphi_\ell(0)|, |\varphi_\ell(M)|)$. That is, $\Pi_\mathcal{G}^{\text{tr}}$, $\Pi_\mathcal{G}^{\text{loc}}$ and $\Pi_\mathcal{G}^{\text{fn}}$ are the largest absolute values of the location prices, transition prices and final cost functions.

Let $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$ be a PTG. A *configuration* of \mathcal{G} is a pair $s = (\ell, \nu) \in L \times \mathbf{R}^+$. We denote by $\text{Conf}_\mathcal{G}$ the set of configurations of \mathcal{G} . Let (ℓ, ν) and (ℓ', ν') be two configurations. Let $\delta = (\ell, I, R, \ell') \in \Delta$ be a transition of \mathcal{G} and $t \in \mathbf{R}^+$ be a delay. Then, there is a (t, δ) -transition from (ℓ, ν) to (ℓ', ν') with cost c , denoted by $(\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{t, \delta, c} (\ell', \nu')$, if (i) $\ell \in L_u$ implies $t = 0$; (ii) $\nu + t \in I$; (iii) $R = \top$ implies $\nu' = 0$; (iv) $R = \perp$ implies $\nu' = \nu + t$; (v) $c = \pi(\delta) + t \times \pi(\ell)$. Observe that the cost of (t, δ) takes into account the price-rate of ℓ , the delay spent in ℓ , and the price of δ . We assume that

¹ Here we differ from [10] where $L_u \subseteq L_{\text{Max}}$.

² The affine restriction on final cost function is to simplify our further arguments, though we do believe that all of our results could be adapted to cope with general cost functions.

³ Observe that this last restriction is *not* without loss of generality in the case of PTGs. While all timed automata \mathcal{A} can be turned into an equivalent (with respect to reachability properties) \mathcal{A}' whose clocks are bounded [4], this technique can not be applied to PTGs, in particular with arbitrary prices.

⁴ Throughout the paper, we often drop the \mathcal{G} in the subscript of several notations when the game is clear from the context.

the game has no deadlock: for all $s \in \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}}$, there are (t, δ, c) and $s' \in \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}}$ such that $s \xrightarrow{t, \delta, c} s'$. Finally, we write $s \xrightarrow{c} s'$ whenever there are t and δ such that $s \xrightarrow{t, \delta, c} s'$. A *play* of \mathcal{G} is a finite or infinite path $\rho = (\ell_0, \nu_0) \xrightarrow{c_0} (\ell_1, \nu_1) \xrightarrow{c_1} (\ell_2, \nu_2) \cdots$. For a finite play $\rho = (\ell_0, \nu_0) \xrightarrow{c_0} (\ell_1, \nu_1) \xrightarrow{c_1} (\ell_2, \nu_2) \cdots \xrightarrow{c_{n-1}} (\ell_n, \nu_n)$, we let $|\rho| = n$. For an infinite play $\rho = (\ell_0, \nu_0) \xrightarrow{c_0} (\ell_1, \nu_1) \xrightarrow{c_1} (\ell_2, \nu_2) \cdots$, we let $|\rho|$ be the least position i such that $\ell_i \in L_f$ if such a position exists, and $|\rho| = +\infty$ otherwise. Then, we let $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}}(\rho)$ be the *cost* of ρ , with $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}}(\rho) = +\infty$ if $|\rho| = +\infty$, and $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}}(\rho) = \sum_{i=0}^{|\rho|-1} c_i + \varphi_{\ell_{|\rho|}}(\nu_{|\rho|})$ otherwise.

A *strategy* for player Min is a function σ_{Min} mapping every finite play ending in location of Min to a pair $(t, \delta) \in \mathbf{R}^+ \times \Delta$, indicating what Min should play. We also request that the strategy proposes only valid pairs (t, δ) , i.e., that for all runs ρ ending in (ℓ, ν) , $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\rho) = (t, (\ell, I, R, \ell'))$ implies that $\nu + t \in I$. Strategies σ_{Max} of player Max are defined accordingly. We let $\text{Strat}_{\text{Min}}(\mathcal{G})$ and $\text{Strat}_{\text{Max}}(\mathcal{G})$ be the sets of strategies of Min and Max, respectively. A pair of strategies $(\sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}}) \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Min}}(\mathcal{G}) \times \text{Strat}_{\text{Max}}(\mathcal{G})$ is called a *profile of strategies*. Together with an initial configuration $s_0 = (\ell_0, \nu_0)$, it defines a unique play $\text{Play}(s_0, \sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}}) = s_0 \xrightarrow{c_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{c_1} s_2 \cdots s_k \xrightarrow{c_k} \cdots$ where for all $j \geq 0$, s_{j+1} is the unique configuration such that $s_j \xrightarrow{t_j, \delta_j, c_j} s_{j+1}$ with $(t_j, \delta_j) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}(s_0 \xrightarrow{c_0} s_1 \cdots s_{j-1} \xrightarrow{c_{j-1}} s_j)$ if $\ell_j \in L_{\text{Min}}$; and $(t_j, \delta_j) = \sigma_{\text{Max}}(s_0 \xrightarrow{c_0} s_1 \cdots s_{j-1} \xrightarrow{c_{j-1}} s_j)$ if $\ell_j \in L_{\text{Max}}$. We let $\text{Play}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$ (respectively, $\text{Play}(s_0, \sigma_{\text{Min}})$) be the set of plays that conform with σ_{Min} (and start in s_0).

As sketched in the introduction, we consider optimal reachability-cost games on PTGs, where the aim of player Min is to reach a location of L_f while minimising the cost. To formalise this objective, we let the value of a strategy σ_{Min} for Min be the function $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}} : \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbf{R}}$ such that for all $s \in \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}}$: $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s) = \sup_{\sigma_{\text{Max}} \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Max}}} \text{Cost}(\text{Play}(s, \sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}}))$. Intuitively, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s)$ is the largest value that Max can achieve when playing against strategy σ_{Min} of Min (it is thus a worst case from the point of view of Min). Symmetrically, for $\sigma_{\text{Max}} \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Max}}$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}}(s) = \inf_{\sigma_{\text{Min}} \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Min}}} \text{Cost}(\text{Play}(s, \sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}}))$, for all $s \in \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}}$. Then, the *upper and lower values* of \mathcal{G} are respectively the functions $\overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} : \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbf{R}}$ and $\underline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} : \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbf{R}}$ where, for all $s \in \text{Conf}_{\mathcal{G}}$, $\overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}}(s) = \inf_{\sigma_{\text{Min}} \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Min}}} \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s)$ and $\underline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}}(s) = \sup_{\sigma_{\text{Max}} \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Max}}} \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}}(s)$. We say that a game is *determined* if the lower and the upper values match for every configuration s , and in this case, we say that the optimal value $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ of the game \mathcal{G} exists, defined by $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}} = \overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} = \underline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}}$. A strategy σ_{Min} of Min is *optimal* (respectively, ε -*optimal*) if $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}} = \overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}}$ ($\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}} \leq \overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} + \varepsilon$), i.e., σ_{Min} ensures that the cost of the plays will be at most $\overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} (\overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} + \varepsilon)$. Symmetrically, a strategy σ_{Max} of Max is *optimal* (respectively, ε -*optimal*) if $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}} = \underline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}}$ ($\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}} \geq \underline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} - \varepsilon$).

Properties of the value. Let us now prove useful preliminary properties of the value function of PTGs, that—as far as we know—had hitherto never been established. Using a general determinacy result by Gale and Stewart [14], we can show that PTGs (with one clock) are *determined*. Hence, the value function $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ exists for all PTG \mathcal{G} . We can further show that, for all locations ℓ , $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is a *piecewise continuous function* that might exhibit discontinuities *only on the borders of the regions* of $\text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}$ (where $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is the function such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)(\nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$ for all $\nu \in \mathbf{R}^+$). See Appendix A for detailed proofs of these results. The continuity holds only in the case of PTGs with a single clock. An example with two clocks and a value function exhibiting discontinuities inside a region is in Appendix B.

► **Theorem 1.** *For all (one-clock) PTGs \mathcal{G} : (i) $\overline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}} = \underline{\text{Val}}_{\mathcal{G}}$, i.e., PTGs are determined; and (ii) for all $r \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}$, for all $\ell \in L$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is either infinite or continuous over r .*

Simple priced timed games. As sketched in the introduction, our main contribution is to solve the special case of simple one-clock priced timed games with arbitrary costs. Formally, an r -SPTG, with $r \in \mathbf{Q}^+ \cap [0, 1]$, is a PTG $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$ such that for all transitions $(\ell, I, R, \ell') \in \Delta$, $I = [0, r]$ and $R = \perp$. Hence, transitions of r -SPTGs are henceforth denoted by (ℓ, ℓ') , dropping the guard and the reset. Then, an SPTG is a 1-SPTG. This paper is devoted mainly to proving the following theorem on SPTGs:

► **Theorem 2.** *Let \mathcal{G} be an SPTG. Then, for all locations $\ell \in L$, the function $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is either infinite, or continuous and piecewise-affine with at most an exponential number of cutpoints. The value functions for all locations, as well as a pair of optimal strategies $(\sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})$ (that always exist if no values are infinite) can be computed in exponential time.*

Before sketching the proof of this theorem, we discuss a class of (simple) strategies that are sufficient to play optimally. Roughly speaking, Max has always a *memoryless* optimal strategy, while Min might need (*finite*) *memory* to play optimally—it is already the case in untimed quantitative reachability games with arbitrary weights (see Appendix C). Moreover, these strategies are finitely representable (recall that even a memoryless strategy depends on the current *configuration* and that there are infinitely many in our time setting).

We formalise Max's strategies with the notion of *finite positional strategy* (FP-strategy): they are memoryless strategies σ (i.e., for all finite plays $\rho_1 = \rho'_1 \xrightarrow{c_1} s$ and $\rho_2 = \rho'_2 \xrightarrow{c_2} s$ ending in the same configuration, we have $\sigma(\rho_1) = \sigma(\rho_2)$), such that for all locations ℓ , there exists a finite sequence of rationals $0 \leq \nu_1^\ell < \nu_2^\ell < \dots < \nu_k^\ell = 1$ and a finite sequence of transitions $\delta_1, \dots, \delta_k \in \Delta$ such that (i) for all $1 \leq i \leq k$, for all $\nu \in (\nu_{i-1}^\ell, \nu_i^\ell]$, either $\sigma(\ell, \nu) = (0, \delta_i)$, or $\sigma(q, \nu) = (\nu_i^\ell - \nu, \delta_i)$ (assuming $\nu_0^\ell = \min(0, \nu_1^\ell)$); and (ii) if $\nu_1^\ell > 0$, then $\sigma(\ell, 0) = (\nu_1^\ell, \delta_1)$. We let $\text{pts}(\sigma)$ be the set of ν_i^ℓ for all ℓ and i , and $\text{int}(\sigma)$ be the set of all successive intervals generated by $\text{pts}(\sigma)$. Finally, we let $|\sigma| = |\text{int}(\sigma)|$ be the size of σ . Intuitively, in an interval $(\nu_{i-1}^\ell, \nu_i^\ell]$, σ always returns the same move: either to take *immediately* δ_i or to wait until the clock reaches the endpoint ν_i^ℓ and then take δ_i .

Min, however may require memory to play optimally. Informally, we will compute optimal *switching* strategies, as introduced in [12] (in the untimed setting). A switching strategy is described by a pair $(\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1, \sigma_{\text{Min}}^2)$ of FP-strategies and a switch threshold K , and consists in playing σ_{Min}^1 until the total accumulated cost of the discrete transitions is below K ; and then to *switch* to strategy σ_{Min}^2 . The role of σ_{Min}^2 is to ensure reaching a final location: it is thus a (classical) attractor strategy. The role of σ_{Min}^1 , on the other hand, is to allow Min to decrease the cost low enough (possibly by forcing negative cycles) to secure a cost below K , and the computation of σ_{Min}^1 is thus the critical point in the computation of an optimal switching strategy. To characterise σ_{Min}^1 , we introduce the notion of negative cycle strategy (NC-strategy). Formally, an NC-strategy σ_{Min} of Min is an FP-strategy such that for all runs $\rho = (\ell_1, \nu) \xrightarrow{c_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu') \in \text{Play}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$ with $\ell_1 = \ell_k$, and ν, ν' in the same interval of $\text{int}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$, the sum of prices of *discrete transitions* is at most -1 , i.e., $\pi(\ell_1, \ell_2) + \dots + \pi(\ell_{k-1}, \ell_k) \leq -1$. To characterise the fact that σ_{Min}^1 must allow Min to reach a cost which is *small enough*, *without necessarily reaching a target state*, we define the *fake value* of an NC-strategy σ_{Min} from a configuration s as $\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s) = \sup\{\text{Cost}(\rho) \mid \rho \in \text{Play}(s, \sigma_{\text{Min}}), \rho \text{ reaches a target}\}$, i.e., the value obtained when *ignoring* the σ_{Min} -induced plays that *do not* reach the target. Thus, clearly, $\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s) \leq \text{Val}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s)$. We say that an NC-strategy is *fake-optimal* if its fake value, in every configuration, is equal to the optimal value of the configuration in the game. This is justified by the following result whose proof relies on the switching strategies described before (see a detailed proof in Appendix D):

Algorithm 1: solveInstant(\mathcal{G}, ν)**Input:** r -SPTG $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$, a valuation $\nu \in [0, r]$

```

1 foreach  $\ell \in L$  do
2   if  $\ell \in L_f$  then  $X(\ell) := \varphi_\ell(\nu)$  else  $X(\ell) := +\infty$ 
3 repeat
4    $X_{\text{pre}} := X$ 
5   foreach  $\ell \in L_{\text{Max}}$  do  $X(\ell) := \max_{(\ell, \ell') \in \Delta} (\pi(\ell, \ell') + X_{\text{pre}}(\ell'))$ 
6   foreach  $\ell \in L_{\text{Min}}$  do  $X(\ell) := \min_{(\ell, \ell') \in \Delta} (\pi(\ell, \ell') + X_{\text{pre}}(\ell'))$ 
7   foreach  $\ell \in L$  such that  $X(\ell) < -(|L| - 1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}}$  do  $X(\ell) := -\infty$ 
8 until  $X = X_{\text{pre}}$ 
9 return  $X$ 

```

► **Lemma 3.** If $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu) \neq +\infty$, for all ℓ and ν , then for all NC-strategies σ_{Min} , there is a strategy σ'_{Min} such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma'_{\text{Min}}}(s) \leq \text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s)$ for all configurations s . In particular, if σ_{Min} is a fake-optimal NC-strategy, then σ'_{Min} is an optimal (switching) strategy of the SPTG.

Then, an SPTG is called *finitely optimal* if (i) Min has a fake-optimal NC-strategy; (ii) Max has an optimal FP-strategy; and (iii) $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is a cost function, for all locations ℓ . The central point in establishing Theorem 2 will thus be to prove that **all SPTGs are finitely optimal**, as this guarantees the existence of well-behaved optimal strategies and value functions. We will also show that they can be computed in exponential time. The proof is by induction on the number of urgent locations of the SPTG. In Section 3, we address the base case of SPTGs with urgent locations only (where no time can elapse). Since these SPTGs are very close to the *untimed* min-cost reachability games of [12], we adapt the algorithm in this work and obtain the `solveInstant` function (Algorithm 1). This function can also compute $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, 1)$ for all ℓ and all games \mathcal{G} (even with non-urgent locations) since time can not elapse anymore when the clock has valuation 1. Next, using the continuity result of Theorem 1, we can detect locations ℓ where $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu) \in \{+\infty, -\infty\}$, for all $\nu \in [0, 1]$, and remove them from the game. Finally, in Section 4 we handle SPTGs with non-urgent locations by refining the technique of [10, 17] (that work only on SPTGs with non-negative costs). Compared to [10, 17], our algorithm is simpler, being iterative, instead of recursive.

3 SPTGs with only urgent locations

Throughout this section, we consider an r -SPTG $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$ where all locations are urgent, i.e., $L_u = L_{\text{Min}} \cup L_{\text{Max}}$. We first explain briefly how we can compute the value function of the game for a *fixed* clock valuation $\nu \in [0, r]$ (more precisely, we can compute the vector $(\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu))_{\ell \in L}$). Since no time can elapse, we can adapt the techniques developed in [12] to solve (untimed) *min-cost reachability games*. The adaptation consists in taking into account the final cost functions (see Appendix E). This yields the function `solveInstant` (Algorithm 1), that computes the vector $(\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu))_{\ell \in L}$ for a fixed ν . The results of [12] also allow us to compute associated optimal strategies: when $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) \notin \{-\infty, +\infty\}$ the optimal strategy for Max is memoryless, and the optimal strategy for Min is a switching strategy $(\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1, \sigma_{\text{Min}}^2)$ with a threshold K (as described in the previous section).

Now let us explain how we can reduce the computation of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell) : \nu \in [0, r] \mapsto \text{Val}(\ell, \nu)$ (for all ℓ) to a *finite number of calls* to `solveInstant`. Let $F_{\mathcal{G}}$ be the set of affine functions over $[0, r]$ such that $F_{\mathcal{G}} = \{k + \varphi_\ell \mid \ell \in L_f \wedge k \in \mathcal{I}\}$, where $\mathcal{I} = [-(|L| - 1)\Pi^{\text{tr}}, |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}}] \cap \mathbf{Z}$.

Observe that $F_{\mathcal{G}}$ has cardinality $2|L|^2\Pi^{\text{tr}}$, i.e., pseudo-polynomial in the size of \mathcal{G} . From [12], we conclude that the functions in $F_{\mathcal{G}}$ are sufficient to characterise $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$, in the following sense: for all $\ell \in L$ and $\nu \in [0, r]$ such that $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) \notin \{-\infty, +\infty\}$, there is $f \in F_{\mathcal{G}}$ with $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) = f(\nu)$ (see Lemma 16, Appendix E for the details). Using the continuity of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ (Theorem 1), we show that all the cutpoints of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ are intersections of functions from $F_{\mathcal{G}}$, i.e., belong to the set of *possible cutpoints* $\text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}} = \{\nu \in [0, r] \mid \exists f_1, f_2 \in F_{\mathcal{G}} \ f_1 \neq f_2 \wedge f_1(\nu) = f_2(\nu)\}$. Observe that $\text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}}$ contains at most $|F_{\mathcal{G}}|^2 = 4|L_f|^4(\Pi^{\text{tr}})^2$ points (also a pseudo-polynomial in the size of \mathcal{G}) since all functions in $F_{\mathcal{G}}$ are affine, and can thus intersect at most once with every other function. Moreover, $\text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}} \subseteq \mathbf{Q}$, since all functions of $F_{\mathcal{G}}$ take rational values in 0 and $r \in \mathbf{Q}$. Thus, for all ℓ , $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is a cost function (with cutpoints in $\text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}}$ and pieces from $F_{\mathcal{G}}$). Since $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is a piecewise affine function, we can characterise it completely by computing only its value on its cutpoints. Hence, we can reconstruct $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ by calling `solveInstant` on each rational valuation $\nu \in \text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}}$. From the optimal strategies computed along `solveInstant` [12], we can also reconstruct a fake-optimal NC-strategy for Min and an optimal FP-strategy for Max, hence:

► **Proposition 4.** *Every r -SPTG \mathcal{G} with only urgent locations is finitely optimal. Moreover, for all locations ℓ , the piecewise affine function $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ has cutpoints in $\text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}}$ of cardinality $4|L_f|^4(\Pi^{\text{tr}})^2$, pseudo-polynomial in the size of \mathcal{G} .*

4 Solving general SPTGs

In this section, we consider SPTGs with possibly non-urgent locations. We first prove that all such SPTGs are finitely optimal. Then, we introduce Algorithm 2 to compute optimal values and strategies of SPTGs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to solve SPTGs with arbitrary weights. Throughout the section, we fix an SPTG $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$ with possibly non-urgent locations. Before presenting our core contributions, let us explain how we can detect locations with infinite values. As already argued, we can compute $\text{Val}(\ell, 1)$ for all ℓ assuming all locations are urgent, since time can not elapse anymore when the clock has valuation 1. This can be done with `solveInstant`. Then, by continuity, $\text{Val}(\ell, 1) = +\infty$ (respectively, $\text{Val}(\ell, 1) = -\infty$), for some ℓ if and only if $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) = +\infty$ (respectively, $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) = -\infty$) for all $\nu \in [0, 1]$. We remove from the game all locations with infinite value without changing the values of other locations (as justified in [12]). Thus, we henceforth assume that $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) \in \mathbf{R}$ for all (ℓ, ν) .

The $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$ construction. To prove finite optimality of SPTGs and to establish correctness of our algorithm, we rely in both cases on a construction that consists in decomposing \mathcal{G} into a sequence of SPTGs with *more urgent locations*. Intuitively, a game with more urgent locations is easier to solve since it is closer to an untimed game (in particular, when all locations are urgent, we can apply the techniques of Section 3). More precisely, given a set L' of non-urgent locations, and a valuation $r_0 \in [0, 1]$, we will define a (possibly infinite) sequence of valuations $1 = r_0 > r_1 > \dots$ and a sequence $\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}, \mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}, \dots$ of SPTGs such that (i) all locations of \mathcal{G} are also present in each \mathcal{G}_{L',r_i} , except that the locations of L' are now urgent; and (ii) for all $i \geq 0$, the value function of \mathcal{G}_{L',r_i} is equal to $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ on the interval $[r_{i+1}, r_i]$. Hence, we can re-construct $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ by assembling well-chosen parts of the values functions of the \mathcal{G}_{L',r_i} (assuming $\inf_i r_i = 0$). This basic result will be exploited in two directions. First, we prove by induction on the number of urgent locations that all SPTGs are finitely optimal, by re-constructing $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ (as well as optimal strategies) as a \triangleright -concatenation of the value functions of a finite sequence of SPTGs with one more urgent locations. The

base case, with only urgent locations, is solved by Proposition 4. This construction suggests a *recursive* algorithm in the spirit of [10, 17] (for non-negative prices). Second, we show that this recursion can be *avoided* (see Algorithm 2). Instead of turning locations urgent one at a time, this algorithm makes them all urgent and computes directly the sequence of SPTGs with only urgent locations. Its proof of correctness relies on the finite optimality of SPTGs and, again, on our basic result linking the values functions of \mathcal{G} and games \mathcal{G}_{L',r_i} .

Let us formalise these constructions. Let \mathcal{G} be an SPTG, let $r \in [0, 1]$ be an endpoint, and let $\mathbf{x} = (x_\ell)_{\ell \in L}$ be a vector of rational values. Then, $\text{wait}(\mathcal{G}, r, \mathbf{x})$ is an r -SPTG in which both players may now decide, in all non-urgent locations ℓ , to *wait* until the clock takes value r , and then to stop the game, adding the cost x_ℓ to the current cost of the play. Formally, $\text{wait}(\mathcal{G}, r, \mathbf{x}) = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L'_f, L_u, \varphi', T', \pi')$ is such that $L'_f = L_f \uplus \{\ell^f \mid \ell \in L \setminus L_u\}$; for all $\ell' \in L_f$ and $\nu \in [0, r]$, $\varphi'_{\ell'}(\nu) = \varphi_{\ell'}(\nu)$, for all $\ell \in L \setminus L_u$, $\varphi'_{\ell^f}(\nu) = (r - \nu) \cdot \pi(\ell) + x_\ell$; $T' = T \cup \{(\ell, [0, r], \perp, \ell^f) \mid \ell \in L \setminus L_u\}$; for all $\delta \in T'$, $\pi'(\delta) = \pi(\delta)$ if $\delta \in T$, and $\pi'(\delta) = 0$ otherwise. Then, we let $\mathcal{G}_r = \text{wait}(\mathcal{G}, r, (\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r))_{\ell \in L})$, i.e., the game obtained thanks to **wait** by letting \mathbf{x} be the value of \mathcal{G} in r . One can check that this first transformation does not alter the value of the game, for valuations before r : $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_r}(\ell, \nu)$ for all $\nu \leq r$.

Next, we make locations urgent. For a set $L' \subseteq L \setminus L_u$ of non-urgent locations, we let $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$ be the SPTG obtained from \mathcal{G}_r by making urgent every location ℓ of L' . Observe that, although all locations $\ell \in L'$ are now urgent in $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$, their clones ℓ^f allow the players to wait until r . When L' is a singleton $\{\ell\}$, we write $\mathcal{G}_{\ell,r}$ instead of $\mathcal{G}_{\{\ell\},r}$. While the construction of \mathcal{G}_r does not change the value of the game, introducing urgent locations *does*. Yet, we can characterise an interval $[a, r]$ on which the value functions of $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{G}_{L',r}$ and $\mathcal{H}^+ = \mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\},r}$ coincide, as stated by the next proposition. The interval $[a, r]$ depends on the *slopes* of the pieces of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{H}^+}$ as depicted in Figure 2: for each location ℓ of Min, the slopes of the pieces of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{H}^+}$ contained in $[a, r]$ should be $\leq -\pi(\ell)$ (and $\geq -\pi(\ell)$ when ℓ belongs to Max). It is proved by lifting optimal strategies of \mathcal{H}^+ into \mathcal{H} , and strongly relies on the determinacy result of Theorem 1:

► **Proposition 5.** *Let $0 \leq a < r \leq 1$, $L' \subseteq L \setminus L_u$ and $\ell \notin L' \cup L_u$ a non-urgent location of Min (respectively, Max). Assume that $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\},r}$ is finitely optimal, and for all $a \leq \nu_1 < \nu_2 \leq r$*


$$\frac{\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\},r}}(\ell, \nu_2) - \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\},r}}(\ell, \nu_1)}{\nu_2 - \nu_1} \geq -\pi(\ell) \quad (\text{respectively, } \leq -\pi(\ell)). \quad (1)$$

Then, for all $\nu \in [a, r]$ and $\ell' \in L$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\},r}}(\ell', \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell', \nu)$. Furthermore, fake-optimal NC-strategies and optimal FP-strategies in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\},r}$ are also fake-optimal and optimal over $[a, r]$ in $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$.


Given an SPTG \mathcal{G} and some *finitely optimal* $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$, we now characterise precisely the left endpoint of the maximal interval ending in r where the value functions of \mathcal{G} and $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$ coincide, with the operator $\text{left}_{L'}: (0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ (or simply **left**, if L' is clear) defined as:

$$\text{left}_{L'}(r) = \sup\{r' \leq r \mid \forall \ell \in L \forall \nu \in [r', r] \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)\}.$$

By continuity of the value (Theorem 1), this supremum exists and $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \text{left}_{L'}(r)) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell, \text{left}_{L'}(r))$. Moreover, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is a cost function on $[\text{left}(r), r]$, since $\mathcal{G}_{L',r}$ is finitely optimal. However, this definition of **left**(r) is semantical. Yet, building on the ideas of Proposition 5, we can effectively compute **left**(r), given $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}$. We claim that $\text{left}_{L'}(r)$ is the *minimal valuation* such that for all locations $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Max}}$), the slopes of the affine sections of the cost function $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell)$ on $[\text{left}(r), r]$ are at least (at most) $-\pi(\ell)$ (see Lemma 20 in appendix). Hence, **left**(r) can be obtained (see Figure 3),



■ **Figure 2** The condition (1) (in the case $L' = \emptyset$ and $\ell \in L_{\text{Min}}$): graphically, it means that the slope between any two points of the plot in $[a, r]$ (represented with a thick line) is greater than or equal to $-\pi(\ell)$ (represented with dashed line).



■ **Figure 3** In this example $L' = \{\ell^*\}$ and $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}}$. $\text{left}(r)$ is the leftmost point such that all slopes on its right are smaller than or equal to $-\pi(\ell^*)$ in the graph of $\text{Val}_{G_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu)$. Dashed lines have slope $-\pi(\ell^*)$.

by inspecting iteratively, for all ℓ of Min (respectively, Max), the slopes of $\text{Val}_{G_{L',r}}(\ell)$, by decreasing valuations, until we find a piece with a slope $> -\pi(\ell)$ (respectively, $< -\pi(\ell)$). This enumeration of the slopes is effective as $\text{Val}_{G_{L',r}}$ has finitely many pieces, by hypothesis. Moreover, this guarantees that $\text{left}(r) < r$. Thus, one can reconstruct Val_G on $[\inf_i r_i, r_0]$ from the value functions of the (potentially infinite) sequence of games $G_{L',r_0}, G_{L',r_1}, \dots$ where $r_{i+1} = \text{left}(r_i)$ for all i such that $r_i > 0$, for all possible choices of non-urgent locations L' . Next, we will define two different ways of choosing L' : the former to prove finite optimality of all SPTGs, the latter to obtain an algorithm to solve them.

SPTGs are finitely optimal. To prove finite optimality of all SPTGs we reason by induction on the number of non-urgent locations and instantiate the previous results to the case where $L' = \{\ell^*\}$ where ℓ^* is a non-urgent location of *minimum price-rate* (i.e., for all $\ell \in L$, $\pi(\ell^*) \leq \pi(\ell)$). Given $r_0 \in [0, 1]$, we let $r_0 > r_1 > \dots$ be the decreasing sequence of valuations such that $r_i = \text{left}_{\ell^*}(r_{i-1})$ for all $i > 0$. As explained before, we will build Val_G on $[\inf_i r_i, r_0]$ from the value functions of games G_{ℓ^*,r_i} . Assuming finite optimality of those games, this will prove that G is finitely optimal *under the condition* that $r_0 > r_1 > \dots$ eventually stops, i.e., $r_i = 0$ for some i . This property is given by the next lemma, which ensures that, for all i , the owner of ℓ^* has a strictly better strategy in configuration (ℓ^*, r_{i+1}) than waiting until r_i in location ℓ^* .

► **Lemma 6.** *If G_{ℓ^*,r_i} is finitely optimal for all $i \geq 0$, then (i) if $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, L_{Max}), $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_{i+1}) < \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i) + (r_i - r_{i+1})\pi(\ell^*)$ (respectively, $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_{i+1}) > \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i) + (r_i - r_{i+1})\pi(\ell^*)$), for all i ; and (ii) there is $i \leq |F_G|^2 + 2$ such that $r_i = 0$.*

By iterating this construction, we make all locations urgent iteratively, and obtain:

► **Proposition 7.** *Every SPTG G is finitely optimal and for all locations ℓ , $\text{Val}_G(\ell)$ has at most $O((\Pi^{\text{tr}}|L|^2)^{2|L|+2})$ cutpoints.*

Proof. As announced, we show by induction on $n \geq 0$ that every r -SPTG G with n non-urgent locations is finitely optimal, and that the number of cutpoints of $\text{Val}_G(\ell)$ is at most $O((\Pi^{\text{tr}}(|L_f| + n^2))^{2n+2})$, which suffices to show the above bound, since $|L_f| + n^2 \leq |L|^2$.

The base case $n = 0$ is given by Proposition 4. Now, assume that \mathcal{G} has at least one non-urgent location, and consider ℓ^* one with minimum price. By induction hypothesis, all r' -SPTGs $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r'}$ are finitely optimal for all $r' \in [0, r]$. Let $r_0 > r_1 > \dots$ be the decreasing sequence defined by $r_0 = r$ and $r_i = \text{left}_{\ell^*}(r_{i-1})$ for all $i \geq 1$. By Lemma 6, there exists $j \leq |\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{G}}|^2 + 2$ such that $r_j = 0$. Moreover, for all $0 < i \leq j$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}} = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}$ on $[r_i, r_{i-1}]$ by definition of $r_i = \text{left}_{\ell^*}(r_{i-1})$, so that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is a cost function on this interval, for all ℓ , and the number of cutpoints on this interval is bounded by $O((\Pi^{\text{tr}}(|L_f| + (n-1)^2 + n))^{2(n-1)+2}) = O((\Pi^{\text{tr}}(|L_f| + n^2))^{2(n-1)+2})$ by induction hypothesis (notice that maximal transition prices are the same in \mathcal{G} and $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}$, but that we add n more final locations in $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}$). Adding the cutpoint 1, summing over i from 0 to $j \leq |\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{G}}|^2 + 2$, and observing that $|\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{G}}| \leq 2\Pi^{\text{tr}}|L_f|$, we bound the number of cutpoints of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ by $O((\Pi^{\text{tr}}(|L_f| + n^2))^{2n+2})$. Finally, we can reconstruct fake-optimal and optimal strategies in \mathcal{G} from the fake-optimal and optimal strategies of $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}$. ◀

Computing the value functions. The finite optimality of SPTGs allows us to compute the value functions. The proof of Proposition 7 suggests a *recursive* algorithm to do so: from an SPTG \mathcal{G} with minimal non-urgent location ℓ^* , solve recursively $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, 1}$, $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, \text{left}(1)}$, $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, \text{left}(\text{left}(1))}$, *etc.* handling the base case where all locations are urgent with Algorithm 1. While our results above show that this is correct and terminates, we propose instead to solve—without the need for recursion—the sequence of games $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, 1}$, $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, \text{left}(1)}$, \dots i.e., *making all locations urgent at once*. Again, the arguments given above prove that this scheme is *correct*, but the key argument of Lemma 6 that ensures *termination* can not be applied in this case. Instead, we rely on the following lemma, stating, that there will be at least one cutpoint of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ in each interval $[\text{left}(r), r]$. Observe that this lemma relies on the fact that \mathcal{G} is finitely optimal, hence the need to first prove this fact independently with the sequence $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, 1}$, $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, \text{left}(1)}$, $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, \text{left}(\text{left}(1))}$, \dots . Termination then follows from the fact that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ has finitely many cutpoints by finite optimality.

► **Lemma 8.** *Let $r_0 \in (0, 1]$ such that \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0} is finitely optimal. Suppose that $r_1 = \text{left}_{L'}(r_0) > 0$, and let $r_2 = \text{left}_{L'}(r_1)$. There exists $r' \in [r_2, r_1)$ and $\ell \in L'$ such that (i) $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ is affine on $[r', r_1]$, of slope equal to $-\pi(\ell)$, and (ii) $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1) \neq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0) + \pi(\ell)(r_0 - r_1)$. As a consequence, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ has a cutpoint in $[r_1, r_0)$.*

Algorithm 2 implements these ideas. Each iteration of the **while** loop computes a new game in the sequence $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, 1}$, $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, \text{left}(1)}$, \dots described above; solves it thanks to **solveInstant**; and thus computes a new portion of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ on an interval on the left of the current point $r \in [0, 1]$. More precisely, the vector $(\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, 1))_{\ell \in L}$ is first computed in line 1. Then, the algorithm enters the **while** loop, and the game \mathcal{G}' obtained when reaching line 6 is $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, 1}$. Then, the algorithm enters the **repeat** loop to analyse this game. Instead of building the whole value function of \mathcal{G}' , Algorithm 2 builds only the parts of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}$ that coincide with $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$. It proceeds by enumerating the possible cutpoints a of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}$, starting in r , by decreasing valuations (line 8), and computes the value of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}$ in each cutpoint thanks to **solveInstant** (line 9), which yields a new piece of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}$. Then, the **if** in line 10 checks whether this new piece coincides with $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$, using the condition given by Proposition 5. If it is the case, the piece of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}$ is added to f_{ℓ} (line 11); **repeat** is stopped otherwise. When exiting the **repeat** loop, variable b has value $\text{left}(1)$. Hence, at the next iteration of the **while** loop, $\mathcal{G}' = \mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, \text{left}(1)}$ when reaching line 6. By continuing this reasoning inductively, one concludes that the successive iterations of the **while** loop compute the sequence $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, 1}$, $\mathcal{G}_{L \setminus L_u, \text{left}(1)}$, \dots as announced, and rebuilds $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ from them. Termination in exponential

Algorithm 2: $\text{solve}(\mathcal{G})$

Input: SPTG $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$

```

1  $\mathbf{f} = (f_\ell)_{\ell \in L} := \text{solveInstant}(\mathcal{G}, 1)$  /*  $f_\ell: \{1\} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbf{R}}$  */
2  $r := 1$ 
3 while  $0 < r$  do /* Invariant:  $f_\ell: [r, 1] \rightarrow \overline{\mathbf{R}}$  */
4    $\mathcal{G}' := \text{wait}(\mathcal{G}, r, \mathbf{f}(r))$  /*  $r$ -SPTG  $\mathcal{G}' = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L'_f, L'_u, \varphi', T', \pi')$  */
5    $L'_u := L'_u \cup L$  /* every location is made urgent */
6    $b := r$ 
7   repeat /* Invariant:  $f_\ell: [b, 1] \rightarrow \overline{\mathbf{R}}$  */
8      $a := \max(\text{PossCP}_{\mathcal{G}'} \cap [0, b))$ 
9      $\mathbf{x} = (x_\ell)_{\ell \in L} := \text{solveInstant}(\mathcal{G}', a)$  /*  $x_\ell = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}(\ell, a)$  */
10    if  $\forall \ell \in L_{\text{Min}} \frac{f_\ell(b) - x_\ell}{b - a} \leq -\pi(\ell) \wedge \forall \ell \in L_{\text{Max}} \frac{f_\ell(b) - x_\ell}{b - a} \geq -\pi(\ell)$  then
11      foreach  $\ell \in L$  do  $f_\ell := (\nu \in [a, b] \mapsto f_\ell(b) + (\nu - b) \frac{f_\ell(b) - x_\ell}{b - a}) \triangleright f_\ell$ 
12       $b := a$ ;  $\text{stop} := \text{false}$ 
13    else  $\text{stop} := \text{true}$ 
14  until  $b = 0$  or  $\text{stop}$ 
15   $r := b$ 
16 return  $\mathbf{f}$ 

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
time is ensured by Lemma 8: each iteration of the **while** loop discovers at least one new cutpoint of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$, and there are at most exponentially many (note that a tighter bound on this number of cutpoints would entail a better complexity of our algorithm).

► **Example 9.** Let us briefly sketch the execution of Algorithm 2 on the SPTG in Figure 1. During the first iteration of the **while** loop, the algorithm computes the correct value functions until the cutpoint $\frac{3}{4}$: in the *repeat* loop, at first $a = 9/10$ but the slope in ℓ_1 is smaller than the slope that would be granted by waiting, as depicted in Figure 1. Then, $a = 3/4$ where the algorithm gives a slope of value -16 in ℓ_2 while the cost of this location of **Max** is -14 . During the first iteration of the **while** loop, the inner **repeat** loop thus ends with $r = 3/4$. The next iterations of the **while** loop end with $r = \frac{1}{2}$ (because ℓ_1 does not pass the test in line 10); $r = \frac{1}{4}$ (because of ℓ_2) and finally with $r = 0$, giving us the value functions on the entire interval $[0, 1]$. All value functions are in Figure 12 in the appendix.

5 Beyond SPTGs

In [10, 17, 15], *general* PTGs with *non-negative prices* are solved by reducing them to a finite sequence of SPTGs, by eliminating guards and resets. It is thus natural to try and adapt these techniques to our general case, in which case Algorithm 2 would allow us to solve *general* PTGs with *arbitrary costs*. Let us explain why it is not (completely) the case. The technique used to remove guards from PTGs consists in enhancing the locations with regions while keeping an equivalent game. This technique *can* be adapted to arbitrary weights, see Appendix H for a proof adapted from [15, Lemma 4.6].

The technique to handle resets, however, consists in *bounding* the number of clock resets that can occur in any play following an optimal strategy of **Min** or **Max**. Then, the PTG can be *unfolded* into a *reset-acyclic* PTG with the same value. By reset-acyclic, we mean that no cycle in the configuration graph visits a transition with a reset. This reset-acyclic PTG



■ **Figure 4** A PTG where the number of resets in optimal plays can not be bounded a priori.

can be decomposed into a finite number of components that contain no reset and are linked by transitions with resets. These components can be solved iteratively, from the bottom to the top, turning them into SPTGs. Thus, if we *assume* that the PTGs we are given as input are reset-acyclic, we can solve them in *exponential time*, and show that their value functions are cost functions with at most exponentially many cutpoints, using our techniques (see Appendix H). Unfortunately, the arguments to bound the number of resets do not hold for arbitrary costs, as shown by the PTG in Figure 4. We claim that $\text{Val}(\ell_0) = 0$; that Min has no optimal strategy, but a family of ε -optimal strategies $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^\varepsilon$ each with value ε ; and that each $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^\varepsilon$ requires *memory whose size depends on ε* and might *yield a play visiting at least $1/\varepsilon$ times the reset* between ℓ_0 and ℓ_1 (hence the number of resets can not be bounded). For all $\varepsilon > 0$, $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^\varepsilon$ consists in: waiting $1 - \varepsilon$ time units in ℓ_0 , then going to ℓ_1 during the $\lceil 1/\varepsilon \rceil$ first visits to ℓ_0 ; and to go directly to ℓ_f afterwards. Against $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^\varepsilon$, Max has two possible choices: (i) either wait 0 time unit in ℓ_1 , wait ε time units in ℓ_2 , then reach ℓ_f ; or (ii) wait ε time unit in ℓ_1 then force the cycle by going back to ℓ_0 and wait for Min's next move. Thus, all plays according to $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^\varepsilon$ will visit a sequence of locations which is either of the form $\ell_0(\ell_1\ell_0)^k\ell_1\ell_2\ell_f$, with $0 \leq k < \lceil 1/\varepsilon \rceil$; or of the form $\ell_0(\ell_1\ell_0)^{\lceil 1/\varepsilon \rceil}\ell_f$. In the former case, the cost of the play will be $-k\varepsilon + 0 + \varepsilon = -(k-1)\varepsilon \leq \varepsilon$; in the latter, $-\varepsilon(\lceil 1/\varepsilon \rceil) + 1 \leq 0$. This shows that $\text{Val}(\ell_0) = 0$, but there is no optimal strategy as none of these strategies allow one to guarantee a cost of 0 (neither does the strategy that waits 1 time unit in ℓ_0).

However, we may apply the result on reset-acyclic PTGs to obtain:

► **Theorem 10.** *The value functions of all one-clock PTGs are cost functions with at most exponentially many cutpoints.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{G} be a one-clock PTG. Let us replace all transitions (ℓ, g, \top, ℓ') resetting the clock by (ℓ, g, \perp, ℓ'') , where ℓ'' is a new final location with $\varphi_{\ell''} = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, 0)$ —observe that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, 0)$ exists even if we can not compute it, so this transformation is well-defined. This yields a reset-acyclic PTG \mathcal{G}' such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'} = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$. ◀

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A Existence and continuity of the value functions: proof of Theorem 1

We start with the proof of determinacy. For all $k \in \mathbf{R}$, define $Threshold(\mathcal{G}, r)$ as the *qualitative* game which is played like \mathcal{G} , and only the objective of Min is altered (in order to make it qualitative): now Min wins a play if and only if the cost of the play is $\leq k$. Further, let $P(k)$ be the set of prefixes of runs ending in a final vertex and whose cost is less than or equal to k . Then the set of winning plays for Min in this game is $S = \bigcup_{\rho \in P(k)} Cone(\rho)$ where $Cone(\rho)$ denotes the set of plays having ρ as a prefix. The set S is an open set in the topology induced by cones. In [14], it is shown that in any game whose set of winning plays is an open set is *determined*, i.e. one of the two players has a winning strategy. Therefore $Threshold(\mathcal{G}, k)$ is determined for all k .

Now let us prove that $\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}} = \overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$. First, recall that, by definition of $\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$ and $\overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}$:

$$\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) \leq \overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) \quad (2)$$

for all configurations c . Fix a configuration c . We consider several cases:

1. First assume that $\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) \in \mathbf{R}$. By definition, for all $k > \underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c)$ and all strategies σ_{Max} , $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}}(c) < k$. Hence, for all $k > \underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c)$, Max has no winning strategy in the game $Threshold(\mathcal{G}, k)$. Therefore, by determinacy of this game, Min has a winning strategy. Equivalently, for all $k > \underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c)$, there exists σ_{Min}^k such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}^k}(c) \leq k$. This implies that:

$$\overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) \leq \underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) \quad (3)$$

Hence, by (3) and (2) we conclude that: $\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) = \overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c)$ when these values are finite.

2. In the case where $\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) = +\infty$, we conclude, by (2) that $\overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) = +\infty$ too.
3. Finally, in the case where $\underline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(c) = -\infty$ then for all k , Max has no winning strategy for $Threshold(\mathcal{G}, k)$. Therefore, by determinacy, Min has a winning strategy σ_{Min}^k in $Threshold(\mathcal{G}, k)$. Thus, for all k : $\overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}} \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}^k}(c) \leq k$, and: $\overline{Val}_{\mathcal{G}} = -\infty$.

We then turn to the proof of continuity. Therefore, our goal is to show that for every location ℓ , region $r \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}$ and valuations ν and ν' in r ,

$$|\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) - \text{Val}(\ell, \nu')| \leq \Pi^{\text{loc}} |\nu - \nu'|.$$

This is equivalent to showing


$$\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) \leq \text{Val}(\ell, \nu') + \Pi^{\text{loc}} |\nu - \nu'| \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Val}(\ell, \nu') \leq \text{Val}(\ell, \nu) + \Pi^{\text{loc}} |\nu - \nu'|.$$

As those two equations are symmetric with respect to ν and ν' , we only have to show either of them. We will thus focus on the latter, which, by using the upper value, can be reformulated as: for all strategies σ_{Min} of Min, there exists a strategy σ'_{Min} such that $\text{Val}^{\sigma'_{\text{Min}}}(\ell, \nu') \leq \text{Val}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(\ell, \nu) + \Pi^{\text{loc}} |\nu - \nu'|$. Note that this last equation is equivalent to say that there exists a function g mapping plays ρ' from (ℓ, ν') , consistent with σ'_{Min} (i.e., such that $\rho' = \text{Play}((\ell, \nu'), \sigma'_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})$ for some strategy σ_{Max} of Max) to plays from (ℓ, ν) , consistent with σ_{Min} , such that

$$\text{Cost}(\rho') \leq \text{Cost}(g(\rho')) + \Pi^{\text{loc}} |\nu - \nu'|.$$

Let $r \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}$, $\nu, \nu' \in r$ and σ_{Min} be a strategy of Min. We define σ'_{Min} and g by induction on the size of their arguments; more precisely, we define $\sigma'_{\text{Min}}(\rho'_1)$ and $g(\rho'_2)$ by induction on k , for all plays ρ'_1 and ρ'_2 from (ℓ, ν') , consistent with σ'_{Min} of size $k-1$ and k , respectively. We also show during this induction that for each play $\rho' = (\ell_1, \nu'_1) \xrightarrow{c'_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c'_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu'_k)$ from (ℓ, ν') , consistent with σ'_{Min} , if we let $(\ell_1, \nu_1) \xrightarrow{c_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c_{\ell-1}} (\ell_k, \nu_k) = g(\rho')$:

- (i) ρ' and $g(\rho')$ have the same length, i.e., $|\rho| = \ell = k = |\rho'|$,
- (ii) for every $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$, ν_i and ν'_i are in the same region, i.e., there exists a region $r' \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}$ such that $\nu_i \in r'$ and $\nu'_i \in r'$,
- (iii) $|\nu_k - \nu'_k| \leq |\nu - \nu'|$,
- (iv) $\text{Cost}(\rho') \leq \text{Cost}(g(\rho')) + \Pi^{\text{loc}} (|\nu - \nu'| - |\nu_k - \nu'_k|)$.



■ **Figure 5** The definition of t' when (a) $\nu'_k \leq \nu_k$, (b) $\nu_k < \nu'_k < \nu_k + t$, (c) $\nu_k < \nu_k + t < \nu'_k$.

Notice that no property is required on the strategy σ'_{Min} for finite plays that do not start in (ℓ, ν') .

If $k = 1$, as there is no play of length 0, nothing has to be done to define σ'_{Min} . Moreover, in that case, $\rho' = (\ell, \nu')$ and $g(\rho') = (\ell, \nu)$. Both plays have size 1, ν and ν' are in the same region by hypothesis of the lemma, and $\text{Cost}(\rho') = \text{Cost}(g(\rho')) = 0$, therefore all four properties are true.

Let us suppose now that the construction is done for a given $k \geq 1$, and perform it for $k + 1$. We start with the construction of σ'_{Min} . To that extent, consider a play $\rho' = (\ell_1, \nu'_1) \xrightarrow{c'_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c'_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu'_k)$ from (ℓ, ν') , consistent with σ'_{Min} such that ℓ_k is a location of player Min. Let t and δ be the choice of delay and transition made by σ_{Min} on $g(\rho')$, i.e., $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(g(\rho')) = (t, \delta)$. Then, we define $\sigma'_{\text{Min}}(\rho') = (t', \delta)$ where $t' = \max(0, \nu_k + t - \nu'_k)$. The delay t' respects the guard of transition δ since either $\nu_k + t = \nu'_k + t'$ or $\nu_k \leq \nu_k + t \leq \nu'_k$, in which case ν'_k is in the same region as $\nu_k + t$ since ν_k and ν'_k are in the same region. This is illustrated in Figure 5.

We now build the mapping g . Let $\rho' = (\ell_1, \nu'_1) \xrightarrow{c'_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c'_k} (\ell_{k+1}, \nu'_{k+1})$ be a play from (ℓ, ν') consistent with σ'_{Min} and $\tilde{\rho}' = (\ell_1, \nu'_1) \xrightarrow{c'_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c'_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu'_k)$ its prefix of size k . Let (t', δ) be the delay and transition taken after $\tilde{\rho}'$. Using the construction of g over plays of length k by induction, the play $g(\tilde{\rho}') = (\ell_1, \nu_1) \xrightarrow{c_1} \dots \xrightarrow{c_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu_k)$ (with $(\ell_1, \nu_1) = (\ell, \nu)$) verifies properties (i), (ii) and (iii). If ℓ_k is a location of Min and $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(g(\tilde{\rho}')) = (t, \delta)$, then $g(\rho') = g(\tilde{\rho}') \xrightarrow{c_k} (\ell_{k+1}, \nu_{k+1})$ is obtained by applying those choices on $g(\tilde{\rho}')$. If ℓ_k is a location of Max, the last valuation ν_{k+1} of $g(\rho')$ is rather obtained by choosing action (t, δ) verifying $t = \max(0, \nu'_k + t' - \nu_k)$. Note that transition δ is allowed since both $\nu_k + t$ and $\nu'_k + t'$ are in the same region (for similar reasons as above).

By induction hypothesis $|\rho'| = |g(\tilde{\rho}')|$, thus (i) holds, i.e., $|\rho'| = |g(\rho')|$. Moreover, ν_{k+1} and ν'_{k+1} are also in the same region as either they are equal to $\nu_k + t$ and $\nu'_k + t'$, respectively, or δ contains a reset in which case $\nu_{k+1} = \nu'_{k+1} = 0$ which proves (ii). To prove (iii), notice that we always have either $\nu_k + t = \nu'_k + t'$ or $\nu_k \leq \nu_k + t \leq \nu'_k = \nu'_k + t'$ or $\nu'_k \leq \nu'_k + t' \leq \nu_k = \nu_k + t$. In all of these possibilities, we have $|(\nu_k + t) - (\nu'_k + t')| \leq |\nu_k - \nu'_k|$. By noticing again that either $\nu_{k+1} = \nu_k + t$ and $\nu'_{k+1} = \nu'_k + t'$, or δ contains a reset in which case $\nu_{k+1} = \nu'_{k+1} = 0$, we conclude the proof of (iii). We finally check property (iv). In both cases:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cost}(\rho') &= \text{Cost}(\tilde{\rho}') + \pi(\delta) + t' \pi(\ell_k) \\ &\leq \text{Cost}(g(\tilde{\rho}')) + \Pi^{\text{loc}}(|\nu - \nu'| - |\nu_k - \nu'_k|) + \pi(\delta) + t' \pi(\ell_k) \\ &= \text{Cost}(g(\rho')) + (t' - t) \pi(\ell_k) + \Pi^{\text{loc}}(|\nu - \nu'| - |\nu_k - \nu'_k|). \end{aligned}$$

If δ contains no reset, let us prove that

$$|t' - t| = |\nu_k - \nu'_k| - |\nu'_{k+1} - \nu_{k+1}|. \quad (4)$$


Indeed, since $t' = \nu'_{k+1} - \nu'_k$ and $t = \nu_{k+1} - \nu_k$, we have $|t' - t| = |\nu'_{k+1} - \nu'_k - (\nu_{k+1} - \nu_k)|$. Then, two cases are possible: either $t' = \max(0, \nu_k + t - \nu'_k)$ or $t = \max(0, \nu'_k + t' - \nu_k)$. So we have three different possibilities:

- if $t' + \nu'_k = t + \nu_k$, $\nu'_{k+1} = \nu_{k+1}$, thus $|t' - t| = |\nu_k - \nu'_k| = |\nu_k - \nu'_k| - |\nu'_{k+1} - \nu_{k+1}|$.
- if $t = 0$, then $\nu_k = \nu_{k+1} \geq \nu'_{k+1} \geq \nu'_k$, thus $|\nu'_{k+1} - \nu'_k - (\nu_{k+1} - \nu_k)| = \nu'_{k+1} - \nu'_k = (\nu_k - \nu'_k) - (\nu_k - \nu'_{k+1}) = |\nu_k - \nu'_k| - |\nu'_{k+1} - \nu_{k+1}|$.
- if $t' = 0$, then $\nu'_k = \nu'_{k+1} \geq \nu_{k+1} \geq \nu_k$, thus $|\nu'_{k+1} - \nu'_k - (\nu_{k+1} - \nu_k)| = \nu_{k+1} - \nu_k = (\nu'_k - \nu_k) - (\nu'_k - \nu_{k+1}) = |\nu_k - \nu'_k| - |\nu'_{k+1} - \nu_{k+1}|$.


If δ contains a reset, then $\nu'_{k+1} = \nu_{k+1}$. If $t' = \nu_k + t - \nu'_k$, we have that $|t' - t| = |\nu_k - \nu'_k|$. Otherwise, either $t = 0$ and $t' \leq \nu_k - \nu'_k$, or $t' = 0$ and $t \leq \nu'_k - \nu_k$.

In all cases, we have proved (4). Coupled with the fact that $|P(\ell_k)| \leq \Pi^{\text{loc}}$, we conclude that:

$$\text{Cost}(\rho') \leq \text{Cost}(g(\rho')) + \Pi^{\text{loc}}(|\nu - \nu'| - |\nu_{k+1} - \nu'_{k+1}|).$$



■ **Figure 6** A PTG with 2 clocks whose value function is not continuous inside a region



■ **Figure 7** An SPTG where Min needs memory to play optimally

Now that σ'_{Min} and g are defined (noticing that g is stable by prefix, we extend naturally its definition to infinite plays), notice that for all play ρ' from (ℓ, ν') consistent with σ'_{Min} , either ρ' does not reach a final location and its cost is $+\infty$, but in this case $g(\rho')$ has also cost $+\infty$; or ρ' is finite. In this case let ν'_k be the clock valuation of its last configuration, and ν_k be the clock valuation of the last configuration of $g(\rho')$. Combining (iii) and (iv) we have $\text{Cost}(\rho') \leq \text{Cost}(g(\rho')) + \Pi^{\text{loc}}|\nu - \nu'|$ which concludes the proof.

B Non-continuity of the value function with more than one clock

Let us consider the example in Figure 6 (that we describe informally since we did not properly define games with multiple clocks), with clocks x and y . One can easily check that, starting from a configuration $(\ell_0, 0, 0.5)$ in location ℓ_0 and where $x = 0$ and $y = 0.5$, the following cycle can be taken: $(\ell_0, 0, 0.5) \xrightarrow{0, \delta_0, 0} (\ell_1, 0, 0.5) \xrightarrow{0.5, \delta_1, 2.5} (\ell_2, 0.5, 0) \xrightarrow{0.5, \delta_2, -2.5} (\ell_0, 0, 0.5)$, where δ_0 , δ_1 and δ_2 denote respectively the transitions from ℓ_0 to ℓ_1 ; from ℓ_1 to ℓ_2 ; and from ℓ_2 to ℓ_0 . Observe that the cost of this cycle is null, and that no other delays can be played, hence $\overline{\text{Val}}(\ell_0, 0, 0.5) = 0$. However, starting from a configuration $(\ell_0, 0, 0.6)$, and following the same path, yields the cycle $(\ell_0, 0, 0.6) \xrightarrow{0, e_0, 0} (\ell_1, 0, 0.6) \xrightarrow{0.4, e_1, 2} (\ell_2, 0.4, 0) \xrightarrow{0.6, e_2, -3} (\ell_0, 0, 0.6)$ with cost -1 . Hence, $\overline{\text{Val}}(\ell_0, 0, 0.6) = -\infty$, and the function is not continuous although both valuations $(0, 0.5)$ and $(0, 0.6)$ are in the same region. Observe that this holds even for priced timed *automata*, since our example requires only one player.

C Memory is required for Min to play optimally

As an example, consider the SPTG of Figure 7, where W is a positive integer, and every location has price-rate 0: hence, this game can be seen as an (untimed) min-cost reachability game as studied in [12], where it has been initially studied. We claim that the values of locations ℓ_1 and ℓ_2 are both $-W$. Indeed, consider the following strategy for Min: during each of the first W visits to ℓ_2 (if any), go to ℓ_1 ; else, go to ℓ_f . Clearly, this strategy ensures that the final location ℓ_f will eventually be reached, and that either (i) transition (ℓ_1, ℓ_f) (with weight $-W$) will eventually be traversed; or (ii) transition (ℓ_1, ℓ_2) (with weight -1) will be traversed at least W times. Hence, in all plays following this strategy, the cost will be at most $-W$. This strategy allows Min to secure $-W$, but he can not ensure a lower cost, since Max always has the opportunity to take the transition (ℓ_1, ℓ_f) (with weight $-W$) instead of cycling between ℓ_1 and ℓ_2 . Hence, Max's optimal choice is to follow the transition (ℓ_1, ℓ_f) as soon as ℓ_1 is reached, securing a cost of $-W$. The Min strategy we have just given is optimal, and there is *no optimal memoryless strategy* for Min. Indeed, always playing (ℓ_2, ℓ_f) does not ensure a cost at most $-W$; and, always playing (ℓ_2, ℓ_1) does not guarantee to reach the target, and this strategy has thus value $+\infty$.

D Fake-optimality: proof of Lemma 3

First of all, notice that all finite plays $\rho \in \text{Play}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$ with all clock valuations in the same interval I of $\text{int}(\sigma)$ verify $\text{Cost}(\rho) \leq |I|\Pi^{\text{loc}} + |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} - |\rho|/|L|$. Indeed, the cost of ρ is the sum of the cost generated by staying in locations, which is bounded by $|I|\Pi^{\text{loc}}$, and the cost of the transitions. One can extract at least $|\rho|/|L|$ cycles with transition prices as most -1 (by definition of an NC-strategy), and what remains is of size at most $|L|$, ensuring that the transition cost is bounded by $|L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} - |\rho|/|L|$.

Then, by splitting runs among intervals of $\text{int}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$, we can easily obtain that all finite plays $\rho \in \text{Play}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$ verify $\text{Cost}(\rho) \leq \Pi^{\text{loc}} + (2|\sigma_{\text{Min}}| - 1) \times |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} - (|\rho| - |\sigma_{\text{Min}}|)/|L|$. Indeed, letting I_1, I_2, \dots, I_k the interval of $\text{int}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$ visited during ρ (with $k \leq |\sigma_{\text{Min}}|$), one can split ρ into k runs $\rho = \rho_1 \xrightarrow{c_1} \rho_2 \xrightarrow{c_2} \dots \rho_k$ such that in ρ_i all clock values are in I_i (remember that SPTGs contain no reset transitions). By the previous inequality, we have $\text{Cost}(\rho_i) \leq |I_i|\Pi^{\text{loc}} + |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} - |\rho_i|/|L|$. Thus, also splitting costs c_i with respect to discrete cost and cost of delaying, we obtain $\text{Cost}(\rho) = \sum_{i=1}^k \text{Cost}(\rho_i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} c_i \leq (2|\sigma_{\text{Min}}| - 1) \times |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} + \Pi^{\text{loc}} - (|\rho| - |\sigma_{\text{Min}}|)/|L|$, since $|\rho| \leq \sum_i |\rho_i| + k \leq \sum_i |\rho_i| + |\sigma_{\text{Min}}|$ and $\sum_i |I_i| \leq 1$.

We now turn to the proof of the lemma. To that extent, we suppose known an attractor strategy for Min, i.e., a strategy that ensures to reach a final location: it exists thanks to the hypothesis on the finiteness of the values. From every configuration, it reaches a final location with a cost bounded above by a given constant M . Notice first that, with the hypothesis that no configuration has a value $-\infty$ in the SPTG we consider, it is not possible that $\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s) = -\infty$ for a configuration s (i.e., that no runs of $\text{Play}(s, \sigma_{\text{Min}})$ reach the target). Indeed, consider the strategy σ'_{Min} obtained by playing σ_{Min} until having computed a cost bounded above by a fixed integer $N \in \mathbf{Z}$, in which case we switch to the attractor strategy. By the previous inequality, the switch is sure to happen since the right term tends to $-\infty$ when the length of ρ tends to ∞ . Then, we know that the value guaranteed by σ'_{Min} is at most N , implying that the optimal value $\text{Val}(s)$ is $-\infty$, which contradicts the hypothesis. Then, to prove the result of the lemma, consider the strategy σ'_{Min} obtained by playing σ_{Min} until having computed a cost bounded above by the finite value $\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s) - M$, in which case we switch to the attractor strategy. Once again, the switch is sure to happen, implying that every play conforming to σ_{Min} reaches the target: moreover, the cost of such a play is necessarily at most $\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s)$ by construction. Then, we directly obtain that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s) \leq \text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(s)$.

E SPTGs with only urgent locations: extended version of Section 3

We rely on the proofs of [12] that can easily be adapted in our case, even though we must give the whole explanation here, knowing that prices coming from goal functions can be rational, and hence do not strictly fall in the framework of [12].

Since all locations in \mathcal{G} are urgent, we may extract from a play $\rho = (\ell_0, \nu) \xrightarrow{c_0} (\ell_1, \nu) \xrightarrow{c_1} \dots$ the clock valuations, as well as prices $c_i = \pi(\ell_i, \ell_{i+1})$, hence denoting plays by their sequence of locations $\ell_0 \ell_1 \dots$. The cost of this play is $\text{Cost}(\rho) = +\infty$ if $\ell_k \notin L_f$ for all $k \geq 0$; and $\text{Cost}(\rho) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \pi(\ell_i, \ell_{i+1}) + \varphi_{\ell_k}(\nu)$ if k is the least position such that $\ell_k \in L_f$.

E.1 Computing the value for a particular valuation

Let us show how to compute the vector $\text{Val}_{\nu} = (\text{Val}(\ell, \nu))_{\ell \in L}$, for a given $\nu \in [0, r]$, in terms of a sequence of values. Following the arguments of [12], we first observe that locations ℓ with values $\text{Val}_{\nu}(\ell) = +\infty$ and $\text{Val}_{\nu}(\ell) = -\infty$ can be pre-computed (using respectively attractor and mean-payoff techniques) and removed from the game without changing the values of the other nodes. Then, because of the particular structure of the game \mathcal{G} (where a real cost is paid only on the target location, all other prices being integers), for all plays ρ , $\text{Cost}(\rho)$ is a value from the set $\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi} = \mathbf{Z} + \{\varphi_{\ell}(\nu) \mid \ell \in L_f\}$. We further define $\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}^{+, \infty} = \mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi} \cup \{+\infty\}$. Clearly, $\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}$ contains at most $|L_f|$ values between two consecutive integers, i.e.,

$$\forall i \in \mathbf{Z} \quad |[i, i+1] \cap \mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}| \leq |L_f| \quad (5)$$

Then, we define an operator $\mathcal{F}: (\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}^{+, \infty})^L \rightarrow (\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}^{+, \infty})^L$ mapping every vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_{\ell})_{\ell \in L}$ of $(\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}^{+, \infty})^L$ to

$\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) = (\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x})_\ell)_{\ell \in L}$ defined by

$$\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x})_\ell = \begin{cases} \varphi_\ell(\nu) & \text{if } \ell \in L_f \\ \max_{(\ell, \ell') \in \Delta} (\pi(\ell, \ell') + x_{\ell'}) & \text{if } \ell \in L_{\text{Max}} \\ \min_{(\ell, \ell') \in \Delta} (\pi(\ell, \ell') + x_{\ell'}) & \text{if } \ell \in L_{\text{Min}}. \end{cases}$$

We will obtain Val_ν as the limit of the sequence $(\mathbf{x}^{(i)})_{i \geq 0}$ defined by $x_\ell^{(0)} = +\infty$ if $\ell \notin L_f$, and $x_\ell^{(0)} = \varphi_\ell(\nu)$ if $\ell \in L_f$, and then $\mathbf{x}^{(i)} = \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}^{(i-1)})$ for $i \geq 0$.

The intuition behind is that x_i is the value of the game (when the clock takes value ν) if we impose that Min must reach the target within i steps (and get a payoff of $+\infty$ if it fails to do so). Formally, for a play $\rho = \ell_0 \ell_1 \dots$, we let $\text{Cost}^{\leq i}(\rho) = \text{Cost}(\rho)$ if $\ell_k \in L_f$ for some $k \leq i$, and $\text{Cost}^{\leq i}(\rho) = +\infty$ otherwise. We further let $\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq i}(\ell) = \inf_{\sigma_{\text{Min}}} \sup_{\sigma_{\text{Max}}} \text{Cost}^{\leq i}(\text{Play}((\ell, \nu), \sigma_{\text{Max}}, \sigma_{\text{Min}}))$ (where σ_{Max} and σ_{Min} are respectively strategies of Max and Min). Lemma 1 of [12] allows us to easily obtain that

► **Lemma 11.** For all $i \geq 0$, and $\ell \in L$: $\mathbf{x}_\ell^{(i)} = \overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq i}(\ell)$.

Now, let us study how the sequence $(\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq i})_{i \geq 0}$ behaves and converges to the finite values of the game. Using again the same arguments as in [12] (\mathcal{F} is a monotonic and Scott-continuous operator over the complete lattice $(\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}^{+\infty})^L$, etc), the sequence $(\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq i})_{i \geq 0}$ converges towards the greatest fixed point of \mathcal{F} . Let us now show that Val_ν is actually this greatest fixed point. First, Corollary 1 of [12] can be adapted to obtain

► **Lemma 12.** For all $\ell \in L$: $\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq |L|}(\ell) \leq |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} + \Pi^{\text{fin}}$.

The next step is to show that the values that can be computed along the sequence (still assuming that $\text{Val}_\nu(\ell)$ is finite for all ℓ) are taken from a finite set:

► **Lemma 13.** For all $i \geq 0$ and for all $\ell \in L$:

$$\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq |L|+i}(\ell) \in \text{PossVal}_\nu = [-(|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}}, |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} + \Pi^{\text{fin}}] \cap \mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}$$

where PossVal_ν has cardinality bounded by $|L_f| \times ((2|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} + 2\Pi^{\text{fin}} + 1)$.

Proof. Following the proof of [12, Lemma 3], it is easy to show that if Min can secure, from some vertex ℓ , a cost less than $-(|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}}$, i.e., $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) < -(|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}}$, then it can secure an arbitrarily small cost from that configuration, i.e., $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) = -\infty$, which contradicts our hypothesis that the value is finite.

Hence, for all $i \geq 0$, for all ℓ : $\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq i}(\ell) \geq \text{Val}_\nu(\ell) > -(|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}}$. By Lemma 12 and since the sequence is non-increasing, we conclude that, for all $i \geq 0$ and for all $\ell \in L$:

$$-(|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}} < \overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq |L|+i}(\ell) \leq |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} + \Pi^{\text{fin}}.$$


Since all $\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq |L|+i}(\ell)$ are also in $\mathbf{Z}_{\nu, \varphi}$, we conclude that $\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq |L|+i}(\ell) \in \text{PossVal}_\nu$ for all $i \geq 0$. The upper bound on the size of PossVal_ν is established by (5). ◀

This allows us to bound the number of iterations needed for the sequence to stabilise. The worst case is where all locations are assigned a value bounded below by $-(|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} - \Pi^{\text{fin}}$ from the highest possible value where all vertices are assigned a value bounded above by $|L|\Pi^{\text{tr}} + \Pi^{\text{fin}}$, which is itself reached after $|L|$ steps. Hence:

► **Corollary 14.** The sequence $(\overline{\text{Val}}^{\leq i})_{i \geq 0}$ stabilises after a number of steps at most $|L_f| \times |L| \times ((2|L|-1)\Pi^{\text{tr}} + 2\Pi^{\text{fin}} + 1) + |L|$.

Finally, the proofs of [12, Lemma 4 and Corollary 2] allow us to conclude that this sequence converges towards the value Val_ν of the game (when all values are finite), which proves that the value iteration scheme of Algorithm 1 computes exactly Val_ν for all $\nu \in [0, r]$. Indeed, this algorithm also works when some values are not finite. As a corollary, we obtain a characterisation of the possible values of \mathcal{G} :

► **Corollary 15.** For all r -SPTG \mathcal{G} with only urgent locations, for all location $\ell \in L$ and valuation $\nu \in [0, r]$, $\text{Val}_\mathcal{G}(\ell, \nu)$ is contained in the set $\text{PossVal}_\nu \cup \{-\infty, +\infty\}$ of cardinal $O(\text{poly}(|L|, \Pi^{\text{tr}}, \Pi^{\text{fin}}))$, pseudo-polynomial with respect to the size of \mathcal{G} .



■ **Figure 8** Network of affine functions defined by F_G : functions in bold are final affine functions of \mathcal{G} , whereas non-bold ones are their translations with weights $k \in [-(|L| - 1)\Pi^{\text{tr}}, |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}}] \cap \mathbf{Z}$. PossCP_G is the set of abscissas of intersection points, represented by black disks.

Finally, Section 3.4 and 3.5 of [12] explain how to compute simultaneously optimal strategies for both players. In our context, this allows us to obtain for every valuation $\nu \in [0, r]$ and location ℓ of an r -SPTG, such that $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) \notin \{-\infty, +\infty\}$, a memoryless optimal strategy for Max, and an optimal switching strategy for Min: a switching strategy is described by a pair $(\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1, \sigma_{\text{Min}}^2)$ of memoryless strategies and a switch threshold K , so that the optimal strategy is obtained by playing σ_{Min}^1 until the value of the current finite play is below K , in which case, we switch to strategy σ_{Min}^2 , that can be taken as an attractor strategy, that only wants to reach a final location.

E.2 Study of the complete value functions: \mathcal{G} is finitely optimal

Still for an r -SPTG with only urgent locations, we now study a precise characterisation of the functions $\text{Val}(\ell): \nu \in [0, r] \mapsto \text{Val}(\ell, \nu)$, for all ℓ , in particular showing that these are cost functions of $\text{CF}_{\{[0, r]\}}$.

We first define the set F_G of affine functions over $[0, r]$ as follows:

$$F_G = \{k + \varphi_\ell \mid \ell \in L_f \wedge k \in [-(|L| - 1)\Pi^{\text{tr}}, |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}}] \cap \mathbf{Z}\}$$

Observe that this set is finite and that its cardinality is $2|L|^2\Pi^{\text{tr}}$, pseudo-polynomial in the size of \mathcal{G} . Moreover, as a direct consequence of Corollary 15, this set contains enough information to compute the value of the game in each possible valuation of the clock, in the following sense:

► **Lemma 16.** *For all $\ell \in L$, for all $\nu \in [0, r]$: if $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu)$ is finite, then there is $f \in F_G$ such that $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) = f(\nu)$.*

We compute the set of intersections of two affine functions of F_G :

$$\text{PossCP}_G = \{\nu \in [0, r] \mid \exists f_1, f_2 \in F_G \quad f_1 \neq f_2 \wedge f_1(\nu) = f_2(\nu)\}.$$

This set is depicted in Figure 8 on an example. Observe that PossCP_G contains at most $|F_G|^2$ points since all functions from F_G are affine, hence they can intersect at most once with every other function. Thus, the cardinality of PossCP_G is $4|L_f|^4(\Pi^{\text{tr}})^2$, also bounded by a pseudo-polynomial in the size of \mathcal{G} . Moreover, since all functions of F_G take rational values in 0 and $r \in \mathbf{Q}$, we know that $\text{PossCP}_G \subseteq \mathbf{Q}$. This set contains all the cutpoints of the value function of \mathcal{G} , as shown in Proposition 4.

Notice, that this result allows us to compute $\text{Val}(\ell)$ for every $\ell \in L$. First, we compute the set $\text{PossCP}_G = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_\ell\}$, which can be done in pseudo-polynomial time in the size of \mathcal{G} . Then, for all $1 \leq i \leq \ell$, we can compute the vectors $(\text{Val}(\ell, y_i))_{\ell \in L}$ of values in each location when the clock takes value y_i using Algorithm 1. This provides the value of $\text{Val}(\ell)$ in each cutpoint, for all locations ℓ , which is sufficient to characterise the whole value function, as it is continuous and piecewise affine. Observe that all cutpoints, and values in the cutpoints, in the value function are rational numbers, so Algorithm 1 is effective. Thanks to the above discussions, this procedure consists in a pseudo-polynomial number of calls to a pseudo-polynomial algorithm, hence, it runs in

pseudo-polynomial time. This allows us to conclude that $\text{Val}_G(\ell)$ is a cost function for all ℓ . This proves item (iii) of the definition of finite optimality for SPTGs with only urgent locations

Let us conclude the proof that SPTGs are finitely optimal by showing that Min has a fake-optimal NC-strategy, and Max has an optimal FP-strategy. Let $\nu_1, \nu_2, \dots, \nu_k$ be the sequence of elements from PossCP_G in increasing order, and let us assume $\nu_0 = 0$. For all $0 \leq i \leq k$ let f_i^ℓ be the function from F_G that defines the piece of $\text{Val}_G(\ell)$ in the interval $[\nu_{i-1}, \nu_i]$ (we have shown above that such an f_i^ℓ always exists). Formally, for all $0 \leq i \leq k$, $f_i^\ell \in F_G$ verifies $\text{Val}(\ell, \nu) = f_i^\ell(\nu)$, for all $\nu \in [\nu_{i-1}, \nu_i]$. Next, for all $1 \leq i \leq k$, let μ_i be a value taken in the middle of $[\nu_{i-1}, \nu_i]$, i.e., $\mu_i = \frac{\nu_{i-1} + \nu_i}{2}$. Note that all μ_i 's are rational values since all ν_i 's are. By applying **solveInstant** in each μ_i , we can compute $(\text{Val}_G(\ell, \mu_i))_{\ell \in L}$, and we can extract an optimal memoryless strategy σ_{Max}^i for Max and an optimal switching strategy σ_{Min}^i for Min. Thus we know that, for all $\ell \in L$, playing σ_{Min}^i (respectively, σ_{Max}^i) from (ℓ, μ_i) allows Min (respectively, Max) to ensure a cost at most (respectively, at least) $\text{Val}_G(\ell, \mu_i) = f_i^\ell(\mu_i)$. However, it is easy to check that the bound given by $f_i^\ell(\mu_i)$ holds in every valuation, i.e., for all ℓ , for all ν

$$\text{Val}_G^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}^i}(\ell, \nu) \leq f_i^\ell(\nu) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Val}_G^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}^i}(\ell, \nu) \geq f_i^\ell(\nu).$$

This holds because: (i) Min can play σ_{Min}^i from all clock valuations (in $[0, r]$) since we are considering an r -SPTG; and (ii) Max does not have more possible strategies from an arbitrary valuation $\nu \in [0, r]$ than from μ_i , because all locations are urgent and time can not elapse (neither from ν , nor from μ_i). And symmetrically for Max.

We conclude that Min can consistently play the same strategy σ_{Min}^i from all configurations (ℓ, ν) with $\nu \in [\nu_{i-1}, \nu_i]$ and secure a cost which is at most $f_i^\ell(\nu) = \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu)$, i.e., σ_{Min}^i is optimal on this interval. By definition of σ_{Min}^i , it is easy to extract from it a fake-optimal NC-strategy (actually, σ_{Min}^i is a switching strategy described by a pair $(\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1, \sigma_{\text{Min}}^2)$, and σ_{Min}^1 can be used to obtain the fake-optimal NC-strategy). The same reasoning applies to strategies of Max and we conclude that Max has an optimal FP-strategy.

F Every SPTG is finitely optimal

We start with an auxiliary lemma showing a property of the rates of change of the value functions associated to non-urgent locations

► **Lemma 17.** *Let G be an r -SPTG, ℓ and ℓ' be non-urgent locations of Min and Max, respectively. Then for all $0 \leq \nu < \nu' \leq r$:*

$$\frac{\text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu') - \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu)}{\nu' - \nu} \geq -\pi(\ell) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\text{Val}_G(\ell', \nu') - \text{Val}_G(\ell', \nu)}{\nu' - \nu} \leq -\pi(\ell').$$

Proof. For the location ℓ , the inequality rewrites in

$$\text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu) \leq (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu').$$

Using the upper definition of the value (thanks to the determinacy result of Theorem 1), it suffices to prove, for all $\varepsilon > 0$, the existence of a strategy σ_{Min} such that for all strategies σ_{Max} of the opponent

$$\text{Cost}(\text{Play}((\ell, \nu), \sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})) \leq (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu') + \varepsilon.$$

The definition of the value implies the existence of a strategy σ'_{Min} such that for all strategies σ_{Max}

$$\text{Cost}(\text{Play}((\ell, \nu'), \sigma'_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})) \leq \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu') + \varepsilon.$$

Then, σ_{Min} can be obtained by playing from (ℓ, ν) , at the first turn, as prescribed by σ'_{Min} but delaying $\nu' - \nu$ time units more (that we are allowed to do since ℓ is non-urgent), and, for other turns, directly like σ'_{Min} . A similar reasoning allows us to obtain the result for ℓ' . ◀

Then, we observe that the construction of G_r does not alter the value of the game:

► **Lemma 18.** *For all $\nu \in [0, r]$ and locations ℓ , $\text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{G_r}(\ell, \nu)$.*

Now, we turn our attention to the construction of $G_{L', r}$. We show that, even if the locations in L' are turned into urgent locations, we may still obtain for them a similar result of the rates of change as the one of Lemma 17:

► **Lemma 19.** *For all locations $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Max}}$), and $\nu \in [0, r]$, $\text{Val}_{G_{L', r}}(\ell, \nu) \leq (r - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_G(\ell, r)$ (respectively, $\text{Val}_{G_{L', r}}(\ell, \nu) \geq (r - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_G(\ell, r)$).*

Proof. It suffices to notice that from (ℓ, ν) , Min (respectively, Max) may choose to go directly in ℓ^f ensuring the value $(r - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_G(\ell, r)$. ◀

F.1 Proof of Proposition 5

Let σ_{Min} and σ_{Max} be a fake-optimal NC-strategy of Min and an optimal FP-strategy of Max in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}$, respectively. Notice that both strategies are also well-defined finite positional strategies in $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$.

First, let us show that σ_{Min} is indeed an NC-strategy in $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$. Take a finite play $(\ell_0, \nu_0) \xrightarrow{c_0} \dots \xrightarrow{c_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu_k)$, of length $k \geq 2$, that conforms with σ_{Min} in $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$, and with $\ell_0 = \ell_k$ and ν_0, ν_k in the same interval I of $\text{int}(\sigma_{\text{Min}})$. For every ℓ_i that is in L_{Min} , and $\nu \in I$, $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell_i, \nu)$ must have a 0 delay, otherwise ν_k would not be in the same interval as ν_0 . Thus, the play $(\ell_0, \nu_0) \xrightarrow{c'_0} \dots \xrightarrow{c'_{k-1}} (\ell_k, \nu_0)$ also conforms with σ_{Min} (with possibly different costs). Furthermore, as all the delays are 0 we are sure that this play is also a valid play in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}$, in which σ_{Min} is an NC-strategy. Therefore, $\pi(\ell_0, \ell_1) + \dots + \pi(\ell_{k-1}, \ell_k) \leq -1$, and σ_{Min} is an NC-strategy in $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$.

We now show the result for $\ell \in L_{\text{Min}}$. The proof for $\ell \in L_{\text{Max}}$ is a straightforward adaptation. Notice that every play in $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$ that conforms with σ_{Min} is also a play in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}$ that conforms with σ_{Min} , as σ_{Min} is defined in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}$ and thus plays with no delay in location ℓ . Thus, for all $\nu \in [a, r]$ and $\ell' \in L$, by the optimality result of Lemma 3,

$$\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r}}(\ell', \nu) \leq \text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(\ell', \nu) = \text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(\ell', \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu). \quad (6)$$

To obtain that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r}}(\ell', \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu)$, it remains to show the reverse inequality. To that extent, let ρ be a finite play in $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$ that conforms with σ_{Max} , starts in a configuration (ℓ', ν) with $\nu \in [a, r]$, and ends in a final location. We show by induction on the length of ρ that $\text{Cost}(\rho) \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu)$. If ρ has size 1 then ℓ' is a final configuration and $\text{Cost}(\rho) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu) = \varphi'_{\ell'}(\nu)$.

Otherwise $\rho = (\ell', \nu) \xrightarrow{c} \rho'$ where ρ' is a run that conforms with σ_{Max} , starting in a configuration (ℓ'', ν'') and ending in a final configuration. By induction hypothesis, we have $\text{Cost}(\rho') \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell'', \nu'')$. We now distinguish three cases, the two first being immediate:

- If $\ell' \in L_{\text{Max}}$, then $\sigma_{\text{Max}}(\ell', \nu)$ leads to the next configuration (ℓ'', ν'') , thus

$$\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}}(\ell', \nu) = c + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}}(\ell'', \nu'') \leq c + \text{Cost}(\rho') = \text{Cost}(\rho).$$

- If $\ell' \in L_{\text{Min}}$, and $\ell' \neq \ell$ or $\nu'' = \nu$, we have that $(\ell', \nu) \xrightarrow{c} (\ell'', \nu'')$ is a valid transition in \mathcal{G}' . Therefore, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu) \leq c + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell'', \nu'')$, hence

$$\text{Cost}(\rho) = c + \text{Cost}(\rho') \geq c + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell'', \nu'') \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu).$$

- Finally, if $\ell' = \ell$ and $\nu'' > \nu$, then $c = (\nu'' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell'')$. As $(\ell, \nu'') \xrightarrow{\pi(\ell, \ell'')} (\ell'', \nu'')$ is a valid transition in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}$, we have $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell, \nu'') \leq \pi(\ell, \ell'') + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell'', \nu'')$. Furthermore, since $\nu'' \in [a, r]$, we can use (1) to obtain

$$\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell, \nu) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell, \nu'') + (\nu'' - \nu)\pi(\ell) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell'', \nu'') + \pi(\ell, \ell'') + (\nu'' - \nu)\pi(\ell).$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cost}(\rho) &= (\nu'' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell'') + \text{Cost}(\rho') \\ &\geq (\nu'' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell'') + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell'', \nu'') \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu). \end{aligned}$$

This concludes the induction. As a consequence,

$$\inf_{\sigma'_{\text{Min}} \in \text{Strat}_{\text{Min}}(\mathcal{G}_{L', r})} \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r}}(\text{Play}((\ell', \nu), \sigma'_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})) \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu)$$

for all locations ℓ' and $\nu \in [a, r]$, which finally proves that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r}}(\ell', \nu) \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}}(\ell', \nu)$. Fake-optimality of σ_{Min} over $[a, r]$ in $\mathcal{G}_{L' \cup \{\ell\}, r}$ is then obtained by (6).

F.2 Proof that $\text{left}(r) < r$

This lemma allows us to effectively compute $\text{left}(r)$:

► **Lemma 20.** *Let \mathcal{G} be an SPTG, $L' \subseteq L \setminus L_u$, and $r \in (0, 1]$, such that $\mathcal{G}_{L', r}$ is finitely optimal for all $L'' \subseteq L'$. Then, $\text{left}_{L'}(r)$ is the minimal valuation such that for all locations $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Max}}$), the slopes of the affine sections of the cost function $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r}}(\ell)$ on $[\text{left}(r), r]$ are at least (respectively, at most) $-\pi(\ell)$. Moreover, $\text{left}(r) < r$.*

Proof. Since $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ on $[\text{left}(r), r]$, and as ℓ is non-urgent in \mathcal{G} , Lemma 17 states that all the slopes of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell)$ are at least (respectively, at most) $-\pi(\ell)$ on $[\text{left}(r), r]$.

We now show the minimality property by contradiction. Therefore, let $r' < \text{left}(r)$ such that all cost functions $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell)$ are affine on $[r', \text{left}(r)]$, and assume that for all $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Max}}$), the slopes of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell)$ on $[r', \text{left}(r)]$ are at least (respectively, at most) $-\pi(\ell)$. Hence, this property holds on $[r', r]$. Then, by applying Proposition 5 $|L'|$ times (here, we use the finite optimality of the games $\mathcal{G}_{L'',r}$ with $L'' \subseteq L'$), one can show that for all $\nu \in [r', r]$ $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_r}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell, \nu)$. Using Lemma 18, we also know that for all $\nu \leq r$, and ℓ , $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_r}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$. Thus, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$. As $r' < \text{left}(r)$, this contradicts the definition of $\text{left}_{L'}(r)$.

We finally prove that $\text{left}(r) < r$. This is immediate in case $\text{left}(r) = 0$, since $r > 0$. Otherwise, from the result obtained previously, we know that there exists $r' < \text{left}(r)$, and $\ell^* \in L'$ such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*)$ is affine on $[r', \text{left}(r)]$ of slope smaller (respectively, greater) than $-\pi(\ell^*)$ if $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Max}}$), i.e.,

$$\begin{cases} \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r') > \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, \text{left}(r)) + (\text{left}(r) - r')\pi(\ell^*) & \text{if } \ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}} \\ \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r') < \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, \text{left}(r)) + (\text{left}(r) - r')\pi(\ell^*) & \text{if } \ell^* \in L_{\text{Max}}. \end{cases}$$

From Lemma 19, we also know that

$$\begin{cases} \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r') \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r) + (r - r')\pi(\ell^*) & \text{if } \ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}} \\ \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r') \geq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r) + (r - r')\pi(\ell^*) & \text{if } \ell^* \in L_{\text{Max}}. \end{cases}$$

Both equations combined imply

$$\begin{cases} \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r) > \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, \text{left}(r)) + (\text{left}(r) - r)\pi(\ell^*) & \text{if } \ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}} \\ \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, r) < \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r}}(\ell^*, \text{left}(r)) + (\text{left}(r) - r)\pi(\ell^*) & \text{if } \ell^* \in L_{\text{Max}} \end{cases}$$

which is not possible if $\text{left}(r) = r$. ◀

F.3 Pieces of the value functions are segments of $F_{\mathcal{G}}$

► **Lemma 21.** Assume that $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}$ is finitely optimal. If $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*)$ is affine on a non-singleton interval $I \subseteq [0, r]$ with a slope greater⁵ than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, then there exists $f \in F_{\mathcal{G}}$ such that for all $\nu \in I$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu) = f(\nu)$.

Proof. Let σ_{Min} and σ_{Max} be some fake-optimal NC-strategy and optimal FP-strategy in $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}$. As I is a non-singleton interval, there exists a subinterval $I' \subset I$, which is not a singleton and is contained in a interval of σ_{Min} and of σ_{Max} .

Let $\nu \in I'$. As already noticed in the proof of Lemma 8, the play $\text{Play}((\ell^*, \nu), \sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})$ necessarily reaches a final location and has cost $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu)$. Let $(\ell_0, \nu_0) \xrightarrow{c_0} \dots (\ell_k, \nu_k)$ be its prefix until the first final location ℓ_k (the prefix used to compute the cost of the play). We also let $\nu' \in I'$ be a valuation such that $\nu < \nu'$.

Assume by contradiction that there exists an index i such that $\nu < \nu_i$ and let i be the smallest of such indices. For each $j < i$, if $\ell_j \in L_{\text{Min}}$, let $(t, \delta) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell_j, \nu)$ and $(t', \delta') = \sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell_j, \nu')$. Similarly, if $\ell_j \in L_{\text{Max}}$, we let $(t, \delta) = \sigma_{\text{Max}}(\ell_j, \nu)$ and $(t', \delta') = \sigma_{\text{Max}}(\ell_j, \nu')$. As I' is contained in an interval of σ_{Min} and σ_{Max} , we have $\delta = \delta'$ and either $t = t' = 0$, or $\nu + t = \nu' + t'$. Applying this result for all $j < i$, we obtain that $(\ell_0, \nu') \xrightarrow{c'_0} \dots (\ell_{i-1}, \nu') \xrightarrow{c'_{i-1}} (\ell_i, \nu_i) \xrightarrow{c_i} \dots (\ell_k, \nu_k)$ is a prefix of $\text{Play}((\ell^*, \nu'), \sigma_{\text{Min}}, \sigma_{\text{Max}})$: notice moreover that, as before, this prefix has cost $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu')$. In particular,


$$\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu') = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu) - (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell_{i-1}) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu) - (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell^*)$$

which implies that the slope of $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*)$ is at most $-\pi(\ell^*)$, and therefore contradicts the hypothesis. As a consequence, we have that $\nu_i = \nu$ for all i .

Again by contradiction, assume now that $\ell_k = \ell^f$ for some $\ell \in L \setminus L_u$. By the same reasoning as before, we then would have $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu') = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu) - (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell)$, which again contradicts the hypothesis.

Therefore, $\ell_k \in L_f$. If we let $w = \pi(\ell_0, \ell_1) + \dots + \pi(\ell_{k-1}, \ell_k)$, we have $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*,r}}(\ell^*, \nu) = w + \varphi_{\ell_k}(\nu)$. Since σ_{Min} and σ_{Max} are FP-strategies, that play constantly in valuation ν , we know that $(\ell_0, \nu) \xrightarrow{c_0} \dots (\ell_k, \nu)$ has no

⁵ For this result, the order does not depend on the owner of the location, but rather depends on the fact that ℓ^* has minimal price amongst locations of \mathcal{G} .



■ **Figure 9** The case $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Max}}$: a geometric proof of $f_i \neq f_j$. The dotted lines represents f_i and f_j , the dashed lines have slope $-\pi(\ell^*)$, and the plain line depicts $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, \cdot)$. Because the slope of f_i is strictly smaller than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, and the value at r_j is above the dashed line it can not be the case that $f_i(r_j) = \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_j) = f_j(r_j)$.

cycle, therefore $w \in [-(|L| - 1)\Pi^{\text{tr}}, |L|\Pi^{\text{tr}}] \cap \mathbf{Z}$. Notice that the previous developments also show that for all $\nu' \in I'$ (here, $\nu < \nu'$ is not needed), $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r}}(\ell^*, \nu') = w + \varphi_{\ell_k}(\nu')$, with the same location ℓ_k , and weight k . Since this equality holds on $I' \subseteq I$ which is not a singleton, and $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r}}(\ell^*)$ is affine on I , it holds everywhere on I . ◀

F.4 Proof of Lemma 6

For the first item, we assume $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}}$, since the proof of the other case only differ with respect to the sense of the inequalities. From Lemma 20, we know that in $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}$ there exists $r' < r_{i+1}$ such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}}(\ell^*)$ is affine of $[r', r_{i+1}]$ and its slope is smaller than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, i.e., $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}}(\ell^*, r_{i+1}) < \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}}(\ell^*, r') - (r_{i+1} - r')\pi(\ell^*)$. Lemma 19 also ensures that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}}(\ell^*, r') \leq \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i) + (r_i - r')\pi(\ell^*)$. Combining both inequalities allows us to conclude.

We now turn to the proof of the second item, showing the stationarity of sequence (r_i) . We consider first the case where $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Max}}$. Let $i > 0$ such that $r_i \neq 0$ (if there exist no such i then $r_1 = 0$). Recall from Lemma 20 that there exists $r'_i < r_i$ such that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*)$ is affine on $[r'_i, r_i]$, of slope greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$. In particular,

$$\frac{\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r_i) - \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r'_i)}{r_i - r'_i} > -\pi(\ell^*).$$

Lemma 21 states that on $[r'_i, r_i]$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*)$ is equal to some $f_i \in \mathcal{F}_G$. As f_i is an affine function, $f_i(r_i) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r_i)$, and $f_i(r'_i) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r'_i)$, for all ν ,


$$f_i(\nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r_i) + \frac{\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r'_i) - \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r_i)}{r_i - r'_i}(r_i - \nu).$$

Since $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}$ is assumed to be finitely optimal, we know that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_{i-1}}}(\ell^*, r_i) = \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i)$, by definition of $r_i = \text{left}_{\ell^*}(r_{i-1})$. Therefore, for all valuation $\nu < r_i$, we have $f_i(\nu) < \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i) + \pi(\ell^*)(r_i - \nu)$.

Consider then $j > i$ such that $r_j \neq 0$. We claim that $f_j \neq f_i$. Indeed, we have $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_j) = f_j(r_j)$. As, in \mathcal{G} , ℓ^* is a non-urgent location, Lemma 17 ensures that (\star) : $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_j) \geq \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i) + \pi(\ell^*)(r_i - r_j)$. As for all i' , $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_{i'}) = f_{i'}(r_{i'})$, (\star) is equivalent to $f_j(r_j) \geq f_i(r_i) + \pi(\ell^*)(r_i - r_j)$. Recall that f_i has a slope strictly greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, therefore $f_i(r_j) < f_i(r_i) + \pi(\ell^*)(r_i - r_j) \leq f_j(r_j)$. As a consequence $f_i \neq f_j$ (this is depicted in Figure 9).

Therefore, there can not be more than $|\mathcal{F}_G| + 1$ non-null elements in the sequence $r_0 \geq r_1 \geq \dots$, which proves that there exists $i \leq |\mathcal{F}_G| + 2$ such that $r_i = 0$.

We continue with the case where $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}}$. Let $r_\infty = \inf\{r_i \mid i \geq 0\}$. In this case, we look at the affine parts of $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ with a slope greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, and we show that there can only be finitely many such segment in $[r_\infty, 1]$. We then show that there is at least one such segment contained in $[r_{i+1}, r_i]$ for all i , bounding the size of the sequence.



■ **Figure 10** In order for the segments $[a, b]$ and $[c, d]$ to be aligned, there must exist a segment with a biggest slope crossing $f_{[a, b]}$ (represented by a dashed line) between b and c .

In the following, we call *segment* every interval $[a, b] \subset (r_\infty, 1]$ such that a and b , are two consecutive cutpoints of the cost function $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ over $(r_\infty, 1]$. Recall that it means that $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ is affine on $[a, b]$, and if we let a' be the greatest cutpoint smaller than a , and b' the smallest cutpoint greater than b , the slopes of $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ on $[a', a]$ and $[b, b']$ are different from the slope on $[a, b]$. We abuse the notations by referring to *the slope of a segment* $[a, b]$ for the slope of $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ on $[a, b]$ and simply call *cutpoint* a cutpoint of $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$.


To every segment $[a, b]$ with a slope greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, we associate a function $f_{[a, b]} \in F_G$ as follows. Let i be the smallest index such that $[a, b] \cap [r_{i+1}, r_i]$ is a non singleton interval $[a', b']$. Lemma 21 ensures that there exists $f_{[a, b]} \in F_G$ such that for all $\nu \in [a', b']$, $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, \nu) = f_{[a, b]}(\nu)$.

Consider now two disjoint segments $[a, b]$ and $[c, d]$ with a slope strictly greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, and assume that $f_{[a, b]} = f_{[c, d]}$ (in particular both segments have the same slope). Without loss of generality, assume that $b < c$. We claim that there exists a segment $[e, g]$ in-between $[a, b]$ and $[c, d]$ with a slope greater than the slope of $[c, d]$, and that $f_{[e, g]}$ and $f_{[a, b]}$ intersect over $[b, c]$, in a point of abscisse x , i.e., $x \in [b, c]$ verifies $f_{[e, g]}(x) = f_{[a, b]}(x)$ (depicted in Figure 10).

Let α be the greatest cutpoint smaller than c . We know that the slope of $[\alpha, c]$ is different from the one of $[c, d]$. If it is greater then define $e = \alpha$ and $x = g = c$, those indeed satisfy the property. If the slope of $[\alpha, c]$ is smaller than the one of $[c, d]$, then for all $\nu \in [\alpha, c)$, $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, \nu) > f_{[c, d]}(\nu)$. Let x be the greatest point in $[b, \alpha]$ such that $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, x) = f_{[c, d]}(x)$. We know that it exists since $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, b) = f_{[c, d]}(b)$, and $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ is continuous. Observe that $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, \nu) > f_{[c, d]}(\nu)$, for all $x < \nu < c$. Finally, let g be the smallest cutpoint of $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ strictly greater than x , and e the greatest cutpoint of $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ smaller than or equal to x . By construction $[e, g]$ is a segment that contains x . The slope of the segment $[e, g]$ is $s_{[e, g]} = \frac{\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, g) - \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, x)}{g - x}$, and the slope of the segment $[c, d]$ is equal to $s_{[c, d]} = \frac{f_{[c, d]}(g) - f_{[c, d]}(x)}{g - x}$. Remembering that $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, x) = f_{[c, d]}(x)$, and that $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, g) > f_{[c, d]}(g)$ since $g \in (x, c)$, we obtain that $s_{[e, g]} > s_{[c, d]}$. Finally, since $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, x) = f_{[c, d]}(x) = f_{[e, g]}(x)$, it is indeed the abscisse of the intersection point of $f_{[c, d]} = f_{[a, b]}$ and $f_{[e, g]}$, which concludes the proof of the previous claim.

For every function $f \in F_G$, there are less than $|F_G|$ intersection points between f and the other functions of F_G (at most one for each pair (f, f')). If f has a slope greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$, thanks to the previous paragraph, we know that there are at most $|F_G|$ segments $[a, b]$ such that $f_{[a, b]} = f$. Summing over all possible functions f , there are at most $|F_G|^2$ segments with a slope greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$.

Now, we link those segments with the valuations r_i 's, for $i > 0$. By item (i), thanks to the finite-optimality of $\mathcal{G}_{\ell^*, r_i}$, $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_{i+1}) < (r_i - r_{i+1})\pi(\ell^*) + \text{Val}_G(\ell^*, r_i)$. Furthermore, Lemma 8 states that the slope of the segment directly on the left of r_i is equal to $-\pi(\ell^*)$. With the previous inequality in mind, this can not be the case if $\text{Val}_G(\ell^*)$ is affine over the whole interval $[r_{i+1}, r_i]$. Thus, there exists a segment $[a, b]$ of slope strictly greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$ such that $b \in [r_{i+1}, r_i]$. As we also know that the slope left to r_{i+1} is $-\pi(\ell^*)$, it must be the case that $a \in [r_{i+1}, r_i]$. Hence, we have shown that in-between r_{i+1} and r_i , there is always a segment (this is depicted in Figure 11). As the number of such segments is bounded by $|F_G|^2$, we know that the sequence r_i



■ **Figure 11** The case $\ell^* \in L_{\text{Min}}$: as the value at r_{i+1} is strictly below $\text{Val}_G(r_i) + \pi(\ell^*)(r_i - r_{i+1})$, as the slope on the left of r_i and of r_{i+1} is $-\pi(\ell^*)$, there must exist a segment (represented with a double line) with slope greater than $-\pi(\ell^*)$ in $[r_{i+1}, r_i]$.

is stationary in at most $|\mathcal{F}_G|^2 + 1$ steps, i.e., that there exists $i \leq |\mathcal{F}_G|^2 + 1$ such that $r_i = 0$.

F.5 Proof of Lemma 8

We denote by r' the smallest valuation (smaller than r_1) such that for all locations ℓ , $\text{Val}_G(\ell)$ is affine over $[r', r_1]$. Then, the proof goes by contradiction: using Lemma 20, we assume that for all $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Max}}$):

- either $(\neg(i))$ the slope of $\text{Val}_G(\ell)$ on $[r', r_1]$ is greater (respectively, smaller) than $-\pi(\ell)$,
- or $((i) \wedge \neg(ii))$ for all $\nu \in [r', r_1]$, $\text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_G(\ell, r_0) + \pi(\ell)(r_0 - \nu)$.

Let σ_{Min}^0 and σ_{Max}^0 (respectively, σ_{Min}^1 and σ_{Max}^1) be a fake-optimal NC-strategy and an optimal FP-strategy in \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0} (respectively, \mathcal{G}_{L', r_1}). Let $r'' = \max(\text{pts}(\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1) \cup \text{pts}(\sigma_{\text{Max}}^1)) \cap [r', r_1]$, so that strategies σ_{Min}^1 and σ_{Max}^1 have the *same behaviour* on all valuations of the interval (r'', r_1) , i.e., either always play urgently the same transition, or wait, in a non-urgent location, until reaching some valuation greater than or equal to r_1 and then play the same transition.

Observe preliminarily that for all $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$ (respectively, $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Max}}$), if on the interval (r'', r_1) , σ_{Min}^1 (respectively, σ_{Max}^1) goes to ℓ^f then the slope on $[r'', r_1]$ (and thus on $[r', r_1]$) is $-\pi(\ell)$. Thus for such a location ℓ , we know that $(i) \wedge \neg(ii)$ holds for ℓ (by letting r' be r'').

For other locations ℓ , we will construct a new pair of NC- and FP-strategies σ_{Min} and σ_{Max} in \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0} such that for all locations ℓ and valuations $\nu \in (r'', r_1)$

$$\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}^0}(\ell, \nu) \leq \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}}^{\sigma_{\text{Max}}^0}(\ell, \nu). \quad (7)$$

As a consequence, with Lemma 3 (over game \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}), one would have that $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu)$, which will raise a contradiction with the definition of r_1 as $\text{left}_{L'}(r_0) < r_0$ (by Lemma 20), and conclude the proof.

We only show the construction for σ_{Min} , as it is very similar for σ_{Max} . Strategy σ_{Min} is obtained by combining strategies σ_{Min}^1 over $[0, r_1]$, and σ_{Min}^0 over $[r_1, r_0]$: a special care has to be spent in case σ_{Min}^1 performs a jump to a location ℓ^f , since then, in σ_{Min} , we rather glue this move with the decision of strategy σ_{Min}^0 in (ℓ, r_1) . Formally, let (ℓ, ν) be a configuration of \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0} with $\ell \in L_{\text{Min}}$. We construct $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell, \nu)$ as follows:

- if $\nu \geq r_1$, $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell, \nu) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}^0(\ell, \nu)$;
- if $\nu < r_1$, $\ell \notin L'$ and $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1(\ell, \nu) = (t, (\ell, \ell^f))$ for some delay t (such that $\nu + t \leq r_1$), we let $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell, \nu) = (r_1 - \nu + t', (\ell, \ell'))$ where $(t', (\ell, \ell')) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}^0(\ell, r_1)$;
- otherwise $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell, \nu) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}^1(\ell, \nu)$.

For all finite plays ρ in \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0} that conform to σ_{Min} , start in a configuration (ℓ, ν) such that $\nu \in (r'', r_0]$ and $\ell \notin \{\ell^f \mid \ell' \in L\}$, and end in a final location, we show by induction that $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Val}_G(\ell, \nu)$. Note that ρ either only contains valuations in $[r_1, r_0]$, or is of the form $(\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c} (\ell^f, \nu')$, or is of the form $(\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c} \rho'$ with ρ' a run that satisfies the above restriction.

- If $\nu \in [r_1, r_0]$, then ρ conforms with σ_{Min}^0 , thus, as σ_{Min}^0 is fake-optimal, $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$ (the last inequality comes from the definition of $r_1 = \text{left}_{L'}(r_0)$). Therefore, in the following cases, we assume that $\nu \in (r'', r_1)$.
- Consider then the case where ρ is of the form $(\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c} (\ell^f, \nu')$.
 - if $\ell \in L' \cap L_{\text{Min}}$, ℓ is urgent in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_0} , thus $\nu' = \nu$. Furthermore, since ρ conforms with σ_{Min} , by construction of σ_{Min} , the choice of σ_{Min}^1 on (r'', r_1) consists in going to ℓ^f , thus, as observed above, $(i) \wedge \neg(ii)$ holds for ℓ . Therefore, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0) + \pi(\ell)(r_0 - \nu) = \varphi_{\ell^f}(\nu) = \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho)$.
 - If $\ell \in L_{\text{Min}} \setminus L'$, by construction, it must be the case that $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell, \nu) = (r_1 - \nu + t', (\ell, \ell^f))$ where $(t, (\ell, \ell^f)) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}^1(\ell, \nu)$ and $(t', (\ell, \ell^f)) = \sigma_{\text{Min}}^0(\ell, r_1)$. Thus, $\nu' = r_1 + t'$. In particular, observe that $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) = (r_1 - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho')$ where $\rho' = (\ell, r_1) \xrightarrow{c'} (\ell^f, \nu')$. As ρ' conforms with σ_{Min}^0 which is fake-optimal in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_0} , $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho') \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\ell, r_1) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1)$ (since $r_1 = \text{left}(r_0)$). Thus $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) \leq (r_1 - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1) = \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\rho'')$ where $\rho'' = (\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c''} (\ell^f, \nu + t)$ conforms with σ_{Min}^1 which is fake-optimal in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_1} . Therefore, $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$ (since $r_1 = \text{left}(r_0)$).
 - If $\ell \in L_{\text{Max}}$ then $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) = (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \varphi_{\ell^f}(\nu') = (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + (r_0 - \nu')\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0) = (r_0 - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0)$. By Lemma 17, since $\ell \in L_{\text{Max}} \setminus L_u$ (ℓ is not urgent in \mathcal{G} since ℓ^f exists), $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1) \geq (r_0 - r_1)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0)$. Furthermore, observe that if we define ρ' as the play $(\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c'} (\ell^f, \nu)$ in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_1} , then ρ' conforms with σ_{Min}^1 and

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\rho') &= (r_1 - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1) \\
 &\geq (r_1 - \nu)\pi(\ell) + (r_0 - r_1)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0) \\
 &= (r_0 - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_0) \\
 &= \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho).
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, as σ_{Min}^1 is fake-optimal in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_1} , $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\rho') \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$.

- We finally consider the case where $\rho = (\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c} \rho'$ with ρ' that starts in configuration (ℓ', ν') such that $\ell' \notin \{\ell''^f \mid \ell'' \in L\}$. By induction hypothesis $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho') \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell', \nu')$.
- If $\nu' \leq r_1$, let ρ'' be the play of \mathcal{G}_{L',r_1} starting in (ℓ', ν') that conforms with σ_{Min}^1 and σ_{Max}^1 . If ρ'' does not reach a final location, since σ_{Min}^1 is an NC-strategy, the costs of its prefixes tend to $-\infty$. By considering the strategy σ'_{Min} of Lemma 3, we would obtain a run conforming with σ_{Max}^1 of cost smaller than $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\ell', \nu')$ which would contradict the optimality of σ_{Max}^1 . Hence, ρ'' reaches the target. Moreover, since σ_{Max}^1 is optimal and σ_{Min}^1 is fake-optimal, we finally know that $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\rho'') = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\ell', \nu') = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell', \nu')$ (since $\nu' \in [\text{left}(r_1), r_1]$). Therefore,


$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) &= (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell') + \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho') \\
 &\leq (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell') + \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell', \nu') \\
 &= (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell') + \text{Cost}(\rho'') = \text{Cost}((\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c'} \rho'')
 \end{aligned}$$

Since the play $(\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c'} \rho''$ conforms with σ_{Min}^1 , we finally have $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Cost}((\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c'} \rho'') \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$.

- If $\nu' > r_1$ and $\ell \in L_{\text{Max}}$, let ρ^1 be the play in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_1} defined by $\rho^1 = (\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c'} (\ell^f, \nu)$ and ρ^0 the play in \mathcal{G}_{L',r_0} defined by $\rho^0 = (\ell, r_1) \xrightarrow{c''} \rho'$. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) &= (\nu' - \nu)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell') + \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho') \\
 &= \underbrace{\varphi_{\ell^f}(\nu)}_{=\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\rho^1)} - \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1) + \underbrace{(\nu' - r_1)\pi(\ell) + \pi(\ell, \ell') + \text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho')}_{=\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho^0)}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Since ρ^0 conforms with σ_{Min}^0 , fake-optimal, and reaches a final location, $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho^0) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\ell, r_1) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, r_1)$ (since $r_1 = \text{left}_{L'}(r_0)$). We also have that ρ^1 conforms with σ_{Min}^1 , so the previous explanations already proved that $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_1}}(\rho^1) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$. As a consequence $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L',r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$.



■ **Figure 12** Value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1

- If $\nu' > r_1$ and $\ell \in L_{\text{Min}}$, we know that ℓ is non-urgent, so that $\ell \notin L'$. Therefore, by definition of σ_{Min} , $\sigma_{\text{Min}}(\ell, \nu) = (r_1 - \nu + t', (\ell, \ell'))$ where $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^1(\ell, \nu) = (t, (\ell, \ell^f))$ for some delay t , and $\sigma_{\text{Min}}^0(\ell, r_1) = (t', (\ell, \ell'))$. If we let ρ^1 be the play in \mathcal{G}_{L', r_1} defined by $\rho^1 = (\ell, \nu) \xrightarrow{c'} (\ell^f, \nu)$ and ρ^0 the play in \mathcal{G}_{L', r_0} defined by $\rho^0 = (\ell, r_1) \xrightarrow{c''} \rho'$, as in the previous case, we obtain that $\text{Cost}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}}(\rho) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$.

As a consequence of this induction, we have shown that for all $\ell \in L$, and for all $\nu \in (r'', r_1)$, $\text{fake}_{\mathcal{G}_{L', r_0}}^{\sigma_{\text{Min}}}(\ell, \nu) \leq \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu)$, which shows one inequality of (7), the other being obtained very similarly.

G Run of the algorithm on an example

Figure 12 shows the value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1. Here is how the algorithm obtains those functions. First it computes the functions at valuation 1, thanks to `solveInstant`. Then, it computes the value of the game where all states are urgent but additional terminal states have been added by the `wait` function to allow waiting until 1. This step gives the correct value functions until the cutpoint $\frac{3}{4}$: in the *repeat* loop, at first $a = 9/10$ but the slope in ℓ_1 is smaller than the slope that would be granted by waiting. Then $a = 3/4$ where the algorithm gives a slope of value -16 in ℓ_2 while the cost of this Max's location is -14 . We thus choose $r := 3/4$ and compute the algorithm on the interval $[0, r]$ with final states allowing one to wait until r and get the already known value in r . The algorithm then stops at $\frac{1}{2}$ in order to allow ℓ_1 to wait, then in $\frac{1}{4}$ because of ℓ_2 and finally the algorithm reaches 0 giving us the value functions on the entire interval $[0, 1]$.

H Reset-acyclic PTGs

Towards solving reset-acyclic PTGs, our first step is to remove strict guards from the transitions, i.e., guards of the form $(a, b]$, $[b, a)$ or (a, b) with $a, b \in \mathbb{N}$. For this, we enhance the PTG with regions in a method similar to what is done in [15, Lemma 4.6]. Formally, let $\mathcal{G} = (L_{\text{Min}}, L_{\text{Max}}, L_f, L_u, \varphi, \Delta, \pi)$ be a PTG. We define the region-PTG of \mathcal{G} as $\mathcal{G}' = (L'_{\text{Min}}, L'_{\text{Max}}, L'_f, L'_u, \varphi', \Delta', \pi')$ where:

- $L'_{\text{Min}} = \{(\ell, I) \mid \ell \in L_{\text{Min}}, I \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}\};$
- $L'_{\text{Max}} = \{(\ell, I) \mid \ell \in L_{\text{Max}}, I \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}\};$
- $L_f = \{(\ell, I) \mid \ell \in L_f, I \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}\};$
- $L_u = \{(\ell, I) \mid \ell \in L_u, I \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}\};$
- $\forall(\ell, I) \in L'_f, \varphi'_{\ell, I} = \varphi_{\ell};$
-

$$\Delta' = \left\{ ((\ell, I), \overline{I_g \cap I}, R, (\ell', I')) \mid (\ell, I_g, R, \ell') \in \Delta, I' = \begin{cases} I & \text{if } R = \perp \\ \{0\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \right\} \\ \cup \{((\ell, (M_k, M_{k+1})), \{M_{k+1}\}, \perp, (\ell, \{M_{k+1}\})) \mid \ell \in L, (M_k, M_{k+1}) \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}\} \\ \cup \{((\ell, \{M_k\}), \{M_k\}, \perp, (\ell, (M_k, M_{k+1}))) \mid \ell \in L, (M_k, M_{k+1}) \in \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}\};$$

- $\forall(\ell, I) \in L', \pi'(\ell, I) = \pi(\ell);$ and $\forall((\ell, I), I_g, R, (\ell', I')) \in \Delta',$ if $(\ell, I_g, R, \ell') \in \Delta,$ then $\pi((\ell, I), I_g, R, (\ell', I')) = \pi(\ell, I_g, R, \ell),$ else $\pi((\ell, I), I_g, R, (\ell', I')) = 0.$

It is easy to verify that, in all configurations $((\ell, \{M_k\}), \nu)$ reachable from the null valuation, the valuation ν is M_k . More interestingly, in all configurations $((\ell, (M_k, M_{k+1})), \nu)$ reachable from the null valuation, the valuation ν is in $[M_k, M_{k+1}]$: indeed if $\nu = M_k$ (respectively, M_{k+1}), it intuitively simulates a configuration of the original game with a valuation arbitrarily close to M_k , but greater than M_k (respectively, smaller than M_{k+1}). The game can thus take transitions with guard $x > M_k$, but can not take transitions with guard $x = M_k$ anymore.

► **Lemma 22.** *Let \mathcal{G} be a one-clock PTG, and \mathcal{G}' be its region-PTG defined as before. For $(\ell, I) \in L \times \text{Reg}_{\mathcal{G}}$ and $\nu \in I$, $\text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}}(\ell, \nu) = \text{Val}_{\mathcal{G}'}((\ell, I), \nu)$. Moreover, we can transform an ε -optimal strategy of \mathcal{G}' into a ε' -optimal strategy of \mathcal{G} with $\varepsilon' > \varepsilon$.*

Proof. The proof consists in replacing strategies of \mathcal{G}' where players can play on the borders of regions, by strategies of \mathcal{G} that play increasingly close to the border as time passes. If played close enough, the loss created can be chosen as small as we want. ◀

Consider now the region-PTG \mathcal{G} associated to a reset-acyclic PTG (and of polynomial size with respect to the original PTG). We can decompose the graph of \mathcal{G} into strongly connected components (that do not contain reset transitions by hypothesis). Consider first its bottom strongly connected components, i.e., components with no reset transitions exiting from them. All clock constraints are of the form $[a, b]$ with $a < b$, or $\{a\}$. We denote by $0 = M_0 < M_1 < \dots < M_K$ the constants appearing in the guards of the component (adding 0). Then, solving the component amounts to (i) solve the sub-game with only transitions with guard $\{M_k\}$, replacing then these transitions by final locations with the cost just computed, (ii) solve the modified sub-game with only transitions with guard $[M_{k-1}, M_k]$, by first shrinking the guards to transform the game into an SPTG, and so on, until $M_0 = 0$. Once all bottom strongly connected components are solved, we replace the reset transitions going to them by final locations again, using the cost computed so far. We continue until no strongly connected components remain. Each SPTG being solvable in exponential time, the overall reset-acyclic can be solved in exponential time too.